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Abstract: Democratic elections are the international norm for government legiti-
macy. Currently, election observers are the primary examiners of claims of democ-
racy. Unfortunately, cost and access restrict their effectiveness. Electoral forensics
complements these observers by statistically testing official results for evidence of
violations of the democratic hypothesis.
This research seeks to revise statistical methods to increase their applicability
and improve their statistical properties vis-à-vis the data types generated in elections.
It focuses on three types of data typically reported by official agencies: candidate
vote count, invalidation count, and geographical location.
Currently, the Benford test serves as the customary vote-count test. I im-
prove this test by modifying it to consider the electoral division size. Similarly,
present methods treat divisions as from a single population. I correct this by includ-
ing a threshold (change-point) in the model. As such, the regression tests become
more powerful, especially when used in conjunction with feasible generalized least
squares regression. Finally, analyses tend to ignore the geographic nature of elec-
tions. I create the spatial-lag expansion model (SLEM) to compete with the popular
geographically weighted regression (GWR) model.
My generalized Benford test improves the Benford test. However, the power
is slight for two of the versions. Allowing for two populations in the election results
increases the power of the regression tests while not affecting their sizes. Finally,
SLEM betters GWR in terms of speed and power; however, the distribution of its
test statistic must still be estimated using simulation.
Even with this advancement in the discipline, there remain a couple areas
needing further treatment. First, GWR is attractive in that it allows modeling the
data more closely. Further work should be done in devising an improved hypothesis-
testing paradigm for it. Finally, electoral systems have unique aspects. Future
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1.1 Raison d’Être . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Testing the Free and Fair Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Simulating Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Digit Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 The Benford test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Improvements to the Benford Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 The Alpha and the Beta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7 Annex 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.8 Annex 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 Regression Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2 Least Squares Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 Changepoint Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5 Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4 Considering Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2 Detecting Spatial Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 The Spatial-Lag Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4 Casetti’s Spatial Expansion Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.5 Geographically Weighted Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
iv
4.6 The Spatially Lagged Expansion Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.7 Type I and Type II Error Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5 Application: Southern Sudan, 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.2 Digit Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.3 Regression Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.4 Geography Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.5 Using Additional Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6 Application: Colorado, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.2 Digit Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.3 Regression Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.4 Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.5 More Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.1 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.2 Denouement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161




2.1 Statistics of B1(0,N) distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Table of observable p-values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 Type I Error rates for Likelihood Simulation Method, US 2004 . . . . . . . . 44
2.4 Type I Error rates for Likelihood Simulation Method, US 2008 . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Likelihood Simulation test results for 10 elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.6 Multinomial Averaging test results for 10 elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 Parameter estimates of Afghan 2009 election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2 Summary statistics for the posterior distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.3 MSE of three estimation methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.1 Regression table for the global model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.2 Regression Table for the Spatial-Lag Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.3 Results of the Expansion Method Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4 List of Common Kernels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5 SLEM Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6 Estimated critical values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125




2.1 Page from a table of logarithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 The LU(0, 6) probability density function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 The LU(0, 6) cumulative distribution function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Benford B1(0,N) distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Extended Benford distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 The probability the leading digit is a ‘1’, as a function of 10θ . . . . . . . . . 24
2.7 Vote distributions in the 2008 US Presidential election . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.8 Distribution of division sizes in the 2008 US presidential election . . . . . . . 26
2.9 Size testing results for the four tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.10 Power testing results for the four tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.11 Plots of the Logit-normal distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.12 McCain support vs a Logitnormal distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.13 Graphic of expected versus observed leading digit frequencies . . . . . . . . . 40
2.14 Graphic of expected versus observed leading digit frequencies . . . . . . . . . 41
2.15 Type I Error rates for Likelihood Simulation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.16 Power estimates for Likelihood Simulation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.17 Expected digit distribution under MA1 and MA2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.18 Power curves for MA1 and MA2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.19 Test statistic distribution: Parametric EBT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.20 Power curve: Parametric EBT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.21 Test statistic distribution: Non-Parametric EBT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.22 Power curve: Non-Parametric EBT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 Histogram of p-values for OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2 Histogram of p-values for FGLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 There may be two populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4 Plots of the sum of square residuals against the threshold, τ . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5 Plots of the sum of square residuals against the threshold, τ . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Plot of the invalidation rate against vote support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.7 Histogram of the calculated p-values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.8 Plot of the invalidation rate against vote support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.9 Plot of the invalidation rate against vote support (SRI) . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.10 Plot of the invalidation rate against vote support (CDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.11 A demonstration of burn-in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.12 Scatterplot of the invalidation rate against candidate support . . . . . . . . 88
vii
4.1 Map of Candidate support for Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2 Maps of invalidation and support rate for Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Examples of Spatial Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4 A simple 2× 4 map. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5 Map of Moran’s Local Ii for Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.6 Map of Moran’s Local Ii for Residuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.7 Comparison of Reality to Spatial-Lag Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.8 Map of Spatially-Varying Effects, SLV Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.9 Map of Spatially-Varying Effects, GWR Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.10 Map of Spatially-Varying Effects, SLEM Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.11 Effect of ρ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.12 Empirical CDF of test statistic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.13 Effect of u on power for the grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.14 Effect of u, v, and uv on power for the grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.15 Effect of u, v, and uv on power for Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.16 Effect of u, v, and uv on power for Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.1 South Sudanese ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.2 Distribution of the log-likelihood for South Sudan (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.3 Invalidation plot for South Sudan (2011) with Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.4 GWR Candidate effects for South Sudan (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.5 SLEM Candidate effects for South Sudan (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.6 Invalidation plot for South Sudan (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.1 Map of Colorado, USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.2 Distribution of the log-likelihood for Colorado (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.3 Invalidation plot for Colorado (2008) with Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.4 Distribution of the test statistic for Colorado (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.5 Invalidation Map: Colorado 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.6 Candidate effects for Colorado (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.7 Turnout effects for Colorado (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.8 Poverty effects for Colorado (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154




June 12, 2009, saw Iranians vote for their next president. That night, after the ballots
were counted, incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner with
over 60% of the vote. The next day, protesters took to the streets to voice their belief
that the election was fraudulent. Western governments concurred.
On November 28, 2010, Ivoirians cast ballots for president of this war-torn country,
between incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and opposition candidate Alassane Ouat-
tara. Neither had received a majority of the vote in October’s first round election, so
they faced each other in the November runoff election. The Independent Electoral Com-
mission declared Ouattara the winner of the second round. The Constitutional Court
declared Gbagbo the winner. The two candidates rallied supporters, who took to the
streets. Ouattara asserted the vote was free and fair and that the Independent Electoral
Commission was the final arbiter. Gbagbo declared the vote free and fair and that the
Constitutional Court was the final arbiter. Both candidates declared their own counts
correct and their opponent’s fraudulent. Thousands of civilians died in the resulting civil
war.
On the same day, Haitians went to the polls to elect a parliament and a president.
No candidate received a majority of the votes cast, so a runoff election was held on March
20, 2011. The two candidates receiving the greatest number of first-round votes were
Mirlande Manigat (with 31%) and Jude Célestin (with 23%); they should have been the
two candidates in the runoff. However, supporters of candidate Michel Martelly protested
1
the vote, forced a recount, denied the validity of the recount, and held demonstrations.
Martelly and his supporters claimed election fraud.
1.1. Raison d’Être
The events described in these three vignettes are not unique. Elections happen. Fre-
quently, losing candidates claim the vote fraudulent. Many elections have international
groups observing, watching for electoral irregularities. These groups are not in all vot-
ing precincts or in all counting locations, thus fraud may still go unseen. Furthermore,
these groups are unable to see systematic unfairnesses in the electoral system. Even with
international observers, fraud exists. Unfair electoral systems exist. Violations of the
democratic claim exist.
This is the raison d’être behind pursuing this research. At their most abstract,
elections are observed outcomes of the sums of categorical random variables. Random
variables have distributions, expected values, expected correlations, etc. This research
scours several areas of statistics, collecting and modifying multiple statistical techniques
in order to better detect violations of democratic claims—violations of the free and fair
hypothesis (Guterres 2008).
1.2. Testing the Free and Fair Hypothesis
There is no single definition of a free and fair election. Political Scientists spend much
ink on the precise meanings of these two terms. At the intersection of all definitions
may be that a free and fair election is one in which each citizen’s vote counts the same
(Kirkpatrick 1984; Wantchekon 1999).
This definition has testable implications. First, ballot box stuffing is a violation.
Those who stuff the box cast more ballots and have ballots more apt to be correctly filled
out and counted than do those of other citizens. Second, declaring a ballot invalid must
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be done independent of the voter’s age, gender, education level, ethnicity, etc., or for
whom the ballot is cast.
Testing the first implication is easily done with the vote counts and the distri-
bution of vote counts in a free and fair election. The former is frequently reported by
the countries. The latter is discussed in Chapter 2. While each ballot cast can be mod-
eled as a Bernoulli random variable, the ballot count totals are neither Binomial nor
Hypergeometric random variables. However, Simon Newcomb (1881) and Frank Benford
(1938) posited a distribution for unbounded counts, which Walter Mebane (2010) used
to examine the 2009 Iranian election.
In Chapter 2, I closely examine the Benford test, including its assumptions. In
addition to the Benford test, I examine several related statistical techniques that rely
solely on the distribution of reported vote counts at the electoral division level. The
results are interesting, because this type of test offers the best opportunity to test for
election fraud.
Testing the second implication is also easily done—as long as the data are avail-
able. Such tests are variations on regressing the invalidation rate against one or more
demographic variables or the level of candidate support (or both). The former regressions
may be able to detect unintended unfairness in the election. The latter regressions may
be able to detect electoral fraud. In Chapter 3, I examine several regression methods.
These models range from the venerable ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
to the much newer feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression and Bayesian
regression. Each method has strengths: OLS is easily performed. FGLS allows one
to estimate the arbitrary correlation matrix. Bayesian regression produces posterior
distributions of the population parameters, not just a final estimate. Each regression
model also has weaknesses.
I compare the several regression methods in terms of the observed Type I Error
rate, and the categorization methods in terms of mean square error.
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All of the regression tests explored in Chapter 3 make some assumption regarding
the independence of measurements and the constancy of effects. As voting is an inherently
spatial event, it may be that the errors are spatially correlated or that the parameters
are spatially varying. The regression techniques of Chapter 3 cannot cover such cases as
stated.
In Chapter 4, I explore the problem of space and propose several solutions. While
controlling the spatial correlation is an option, spatially varying effects are interesting
in and of themselves. As such, merely controlling the effect of space is fundamentally
unsatisfying. Currently, there are three methods for modeling in the presence of spatial
correlation: spatially-lagged dependent variable regression, Casetti’s expansion method,
and Fotheringham’s geographically weighted regression. All have strengths and weak-
nesses.
The spatially lagged dependent variable model is easy to implement. It merely
includes a spatially-lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. That this
method can be used in all of the regression methods of Chapter 3 is its strength. That
its effect estimates are biased is its weakness. However, is the bias small enough as to
allow its flexibility to outweigh it? Furthermore, while the estimates are biased, is its
mean square error smaller than that of other methods? If so, then this method may still
be preferred.
Emilio Casetti (1972) created the expansion method to model spatially varying
effects. It is a type of regression and can also work within the context of the Chapter
3 regression methods. This method includes functions (linear, quadratic, logistic, etc.)
of the location as additional independent variables and of currently used independent
variables. Its main weakness is that the function must be known a priori.
A. Stewart Fotheringham and associates (1996; 1997; 1998) developed a flexible
alternative to Casetti’s expansion method. In lieu of the researcher specifying the shape
of the effect surface, Fotheringham suggested allowing the data to determine the shape.
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As such, he and his associates created the geographically weighted regression (GWR)
method. In this method, the effects are estimated at each point in space using the
nearby points as data, usually weighted according to distance. The major drawback is
that there is no parametric test either for the effects or for whether those effects are
spatially varying. This severely limits its utility.
In Chapter 4, I then compare the GWR method with my proposed method (SLEM)
in terms of the Type I Error rate and of the power. I conclude by discussing a few
interesting points about the power curves.
While each chapter includes limited illustrations of the techniques discussed, I fully
apply all of the approved techniques discussed to two cases. In Chapter 5, I apply them
to a questionable election, the Unity referendum of 2011 in Southern Sudan. In Chapter
6, I apply them to an election that is allegedly free and fair, the 2008 US Presidential
election in Colorado. These two chapters should illustrate a correct application of the
methods.
1.3. Simulating Elections
Throughout this research, there is a need to compare estimators. There are several
available criteria. The bias is a measure of how close the average estimate is to the true
value. The mean square error is a measure of how concentrated the estimates are around
the true value. Both of these are important in comparing estimators. However, before an
estimator should be compared, it should meet one criterion: The true Type I Error rate
must be close to the nominal rate. Testing this is rather unambiguous. One generates
multiple “free and fair” elections, performs the test on each, the compares the rejection
rate with the nominal rate, α. This is easy if you can generate free and fair elections.
Deckert et al. (2011) assert that there is no a priori distribution for voting.
The second aspect of a test that should be examined is its power—the ability of the
test to reject a false null hypothesis. Where the previous requires randomly generated free
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and fair elections, this requires randomly generated unfair elections. This is significantly
more difficult. If there is no distribution for a fair election, then it cannot be modified
to be unfair.
To solve these issues, I do two things. First, I make the explicit assumption that
the 2008 presidential elections in the United States are free and fair. From those election
data, I extract the division size and the proportion of the vote in each division cast for
John McCain—the candidate of the incumbent party. The former variable is the electoral
division sizes; the latter, the proportion data.
The free and fair elections are generated by drawing a random sample, with re-
placement, from the proportion data. Those proportions then multiply the electoral
division size data, which is not permuted. As neither the electoral division sizes nor the
proportion of the vote in favor of the candidate are fraudulent, this method has face
validity.
Generating unfair elections is not as easy; elections can be unfair in several ways.
In Chapter 2, I modify the fair elections with different levels of three contaminants.
Contaminant One is shifting the leading digit up one. As this chapter consists of digit
tests, this is equivalent to ballot counters writing in fraudulent counts with the next
leading digit. The second contaminant is the uniform distribution. This would represent
the same situation as above, but with the ballot counter replacing the true counts with
counts having a random leading digit. The third contaminant is replacing all initial digits
with a ‘9.’
For Chapter 3, the leading digits are not important, per se. What is important is
the relationship between the invalidation rate and the candidate support in each division.
Under the null hypothesis, this relationship is independent, which can be easily simulated.
Again, the contaminated elections are more difficult to simulate.
These fraudulent elections are generated by selecting a threshold (τ = 0.60),
creating a sloped regression line to its right, then add varying levels of “noise” (increase
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the variance of the residuals). When the noise is great, the mean square error of the tests
should be high. When the noise is minor, the MSE should be small.
This method carries over without change into Chapter 4, where geography becomes
an important factor. I do not explicitly consider geography when placing the stuffing
ballots; I allow the underlying geographic correlation of candidate support do that.
1.4. Notation
Finally, before beginning our journey, we need to discuss notation briefly. Rarely is
there standard notation in statistics. As such, I shall provide a listing of notation I use
throughout this research.
The following are several distributions used in this research.
Name Symbol Parameter(s) Page
Benford B1 θ 15
Beta BETA α, β 84
Gamma GAMMA κ, θ 85
Log-uniform LU θa, θb 14
Logit-normal LgtN µ, σ2 37
Multinomial Multi n, π 30
Normal N µ, σ2 37
Uniform U θa, θb 14
The following indicate the meaning of the symbol based on its size and national origin.
Majuscule Greek Parameter space Θ
Minuscule Greek Population parameter θ
Majuscule Roman Random variable X
Minuscule Roman Observed random variable or x
non-random variable
Finally, X is a matrix or a vector, X is a scalar, “ln” is the natural logarithm (base-e),
and “log” is the common logarithm (base-10).
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1.5. Conclusion
This introductory chapter framed the issue: Some elections experience fraud and the
current detection techniques are few and far between. Statistical tests require data.
Increased amounts of data provide a better chance of detecting electoral fraud and other
violations of the free and fair hypothesis.
Unfortunately, those data are controlled by the same government we hope to test.
As such, the data may be sparse. For instance, the 2009 Afghan presidential election
only reported the vote counts in each division (wilāyat). These data require a different
battery of tests than elections in which vote counts, invalidation counts, and demographic
variables are measured to the precinct level.
In the next chapter, I introduce you to the 2009 Afghan election as well as digit




Afghanistan, 2009. Afghanistan’s second presidential election under its 2004 con-
stitution took place on August 20, 2009. This election pitted incumbent Hamid Karzai
against challenger Abdullah Abdullah, M.D., of the United National Front. The cam-
paign saw the use of the state-run media and intimidation to affect the outcome. Public
opinion polls gave Karzai a wide lead, but falling short of giving him the needed majority
to avoid an October runoff election.
Election day was predictable. The Taliban called for a boycott of the “Western-
led” poll. Violence broke out at several polling places. Challengers made charges of
ballot-box stuffing and of false counting (Galbraith 2009).
Two days later, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced its official
results: Karzai received 54.6% of the valid votes cast (Afghanistan 2009b). The UN-
dominated Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), the final arbiter of the election,
refused to validate the election until all fraud claims were adjudicated. However, even
this did not progress smoothly. Methods of determining the proportion of votes to remove
met with charges of Western meddling.
One thing was true: If there were a second round election, it would be between
Karzai and Abdullah. Under US pressure, Karzai accepted a runoff election, now to be
scheduled for November 7, 2009. Abdullah demanded certain members of the IEC be
removed. They refused, Abdullah withdrew from the runoff election, and the IEC named
Hamid Karzai President-elect (Galbraith 2009).
Doubts over the extent of the fraud claims linger. However, because of the extant
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situation, the only numbers easily available are the vote counts at the province level
(wilāyat).
2.1. Introduction
Across the world, democratic elections are becoming the norm. Several non-democracies
even hold elections to provide a veneer of popular legitimacy (Wantchekon 1999). As
such, the presence of the word ‘democracy’ does not necessarily indicate a democratic
election. While Political Scientists do not agree on the specific requirements of a demo-
cratic election, they do appear to agree that electoral fraud is not democratic. When the
followers of a candidate stuff a ballot box with prepared ballots or falsify vote counts,
fraud has taken place. Luckily, both of these acts leave behind evidence. The trick is to
find that evidence.
A goal of electoral forensics is to determine, using statistical methods, if an election
violates the assumption of democracy, if the election violates the free and fair hypothesis.
Democratic elections must be free and fair. They must be free in the sense that voting
is allowed. They must be fair in the sense that a person’s ballot counts the same an any
other person’s ballot—or at least has the same probability of counting.
Unfortunately, the information needed to test for fraud is controlled by the very
government being tested. This usually means the level of information available is quite
limited. With this reality, electoral forensics seeks testing methods given the slight infor-
mation available. Fortunately, many elections provide the vote counts for the candidates
in each first-level administrative division. This is what Afghanistan’s Independent Elec-
tion Commission offered from the 2009 Presidential election.
Currently, the Benford test is the standard method for testing for violations of the
free and fair hypothesis when only vote counts are available (Mebane 2010). The Benford
test compares the actual digit frequencies to a hypothesized distribution. A usual method
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of frequentist statistics is to calculate a test statistic for which a distribution is knowable.
From that, a p-value can be calculated. This is the strength of the Benford test. It offers
a statistical test of the free and fair hypothesis based solely on the assumed distribution
of vote counts.
It is not the only possible test, nor is it the best in all situations. This chapter
introduces the history of the Benford test and its uses. It then explores its applicability
to election data, concluding that the extant test has severe shortcomings.
To compensate for those issues, I modify it and formulate additional tests. Those
tests include both parametric and non-parametric simulation. To accomplish a non-
parametric simulation test, I introduce the Logit-normal distribution, which models the
vote proportion for each candidate in an election. With this distribution, the parametric
test surpasses both the Benford test and the non-parametric simulation test.
2.2. History
While browsing a book of logarithms (e.g., Figure 2.1), Harvard astronomer Simon New-
comb (1881, p. 39) noticed something interesting:
That the ten digits do not occur with equal frequency must be evident to any
one making much use of logarithmic tables, and noticing how much faster the
first pages wear out than the last ones. The first significant figure is oftener
1 than any other digit, and the frequency diminishes up to 9.
From this observation, he derived the distribution of those leading digits. More impor-
tantly to him, he concluded that one could distinguish between a table of numbers arising
in nature and their logarithms. The leading digits of the former follow the described dis-
tribution; of the latter, a uniform distribution.
Fifty-two years later, Physicist Frank Benford made the same observation, “[t]he
pages containing the logarithms of the low numbers 1 and 2 are apt to be more stained
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Figure 2.1: A scan of a page from Richard Farley’s Tables of Logarithms (1839). This is the
first table in the book. Its level of wear can be inferred through the poor quality of the top edge
of the book.
and frayed by use than those of the higher numbers 8 and 9” (Benford 1938, p. 551).
Benford’s contribution is not the observation, but the application (Benford 1938, p. 551):
. . . no one could be expected to be greatly interested in the condition of a table
of logarithms, but the matter may be considered more worthy of study when
we recall that the table is used in the building up of our scientific, engineering,
and general factual literature. There may be, in the relative cleanliness of the
pages of a logarithm table, data on how we think and how we react when
dealing with things that can be described by means of numbers.
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In the course of his research, he gathered numbers from many sources and tested the
leading-digit distribution for each source and for the union of the sources. These sources
ranged from lengths of rivers to addresses in the telephone book to the mathematical
sequence {n, n2, n3, . . .}. While the individual sources did not always follow the prescribed
distribution (river lengths did, the mathematical sequence did not), the entirety of the
sources did.
Examining the table, Benford concluded that those sources of a random nature
followed the “logarithmic law” much more closely than those sources arising from a
mathematical formula (Benford 1938, p. 557):
These facts lead to the conclusion that the logarithmic law applies particularly
to those outlaw numbers that are without known relationship rather than to
those that individually follow an orderly course; and therefore the logarithmic
relation is essentially a Law of Anomalous Numbers.
With that said, in the third part of the article, Benford derives the distribution of leading
digits when the numbers are integers from 1 to a given upper bound. That such a sequence
“follows an orderly course” should indicate that the leading digits would not well follow
the Law of Anomalous Numbers. However, Benford shows this sequence closely agrees
with this “Law” for upper bounds larger than 1000.
It is this distribution of leading digits of the integers from 1 to n that became the
basis for using statistics to detect fraud (Cho and Gaines 2007; Hill 1995; Mebane 2010;
Nigrini 2011, 2012) and deviations from random behavior (Carslaw 1988; Ley 1996).
2.2.1 Derivation of the Benford distribution. To calculate Benford’s proba-
bility mass function, we return to Newcomb. Recall that Newcomb observed the ear-
lier pages of logarithm books were more worn than later pages; that is, those pages
dealing with numbers beginning with a 1 were used more often. From this, Newcomb
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Figure 2.2: The probability density function of the LU(0, 6) distribution over its support,
[1, 106]
deduced that the probability of a given digit being the leading digit of a number was
log(d+ 1)− log(d).
Definition 2.1 (Log-uniform Distribution). Define Y as a Uniformly distributed random
variable, Y ∼ U(0, θ), with θ being its maximum value. Then X := 10Y has a Log-
uniform distribution, symbolized as X ∼ LU(0, θ), with support X ∈ [1, 10θ].




ability density function fX(x) =
1
x θ ln 10
, where log and ln are the common and natural
logarithm functions, respectively. Figure 2.2 provides the probability density function
for the Log-uniform distribution over its support; Figure 2.3, its cumulative distribution
function.
Definition 2.2 (Leading-digit Function). Define the leading-digit function D1(x) taking








0 x = 0
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Figure 2.3: The cumulative distribution function of the LU(0, 6) distribution over its support
set, S = [1, 106].
This leads to the Benford distribution:
Definition 2.3 (Benford Distribution). If X ∼ LU(0, θ), then the distribution of D1(X)
is the Benford distribution of order 1, designated D ∼ B1(0, θ), where D := D1(X).
If θ ∈ N, then B1(0, θ) is termed the integer Benford distribution. Now, to de-
termine the probability mass function of the Benford distribution, we have two cases. In
the first, θ ∈ N. In the second, θ /∈ N. The derivation in the first case is simple; in the
second, more complex.
Possibility 1: θ ∈ N: Let us now deal with the first possibility. Here, θ ∈ N :=
{1, 2, 3, 4, . . .}. This is the simple case as the probability function of the Benford distri-
bution is independent of θ.
Newcomb (1881) provided a proof of this based on a limiting equispaced circular
distribution. Benford’s proof (1938) relies on a counting argument. The following proof
relies on the cumulative distribution function.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of lead digits according to the integer Benford distribution, B1(0, θ),
θ ∈ N. Note that the lead digit is not uniformly distributed. In fact, the probability of the lead
digit being a ‘1’ is more than six times that of it being a ‘9’.
Lemma 2.4. The probability mass function of the integer Benford distribution, B1(0, θ) :=





for θ ∈ N.
Proof. Recall X ∼ LU(0, θ) and FX(x) = log xθ . Then, P[D1(X) = d |θ] is equivalent to
calculating the area under the pdf curve corresponding to values with leading digit d.
Equivalently, this is summing up over integer powers of 10 the differences in the CDF
values of (d+ 1)× 10i and d× 10i. That is:
















log(d+ 1) + i
θ












= log(d+ 1)− log d
Algebra provides the conclusion.
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Statistic Definition Approx Value
E[D ] µ1 3.440





Table 2.1: Approximate values of some population statistics of the B1(0, θ) distribution, with
θ ∈ N
The probability mass function (pmf) of the integer Benford distribution, B1(0, θ),
is graphed in Figure 2.4. Note the differences in probabilities among the digits.
Proposition 2.5. Let D ∼ B1(0, θ), with θ ∈ N. Table 2.1 holds.
These simple population statistics are of little help by themselves. A symmetric
95% confidence interval on a single leading digit is [1, 9]. However, multiple samples
shrink the width of the confidence interval, making testing possible.
Proposition 2.6. Let Di
iid∼ B1(0, θ), with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. If X :=
∑n
i=1Di, then
E[X ] = E[D1 ] and V[X ] = 1nV[D1 ].
Proposition 2.6 is useful in estimating confidence intervals for the average lead-
ing digit in a dataset. For instance, the Afghan dataset contains vote counts for each
candidate from the 34 wilāyat. If the leading digits for each wilāyat follow the Benford
distribution, then the expected leading digit will be 3.44 and an estimated 95% confi-
dence interval for n = 34 will be from 2.65 to 4.29, using simulation. Using a Normal
approximation (via the Central Limit Theorem), the symmetric 95% confidence interval
will be from 2.61 to 4.27. The observed mean leading digit for President Hamid Karzai is
3.294118, which is within both confidence intervals. Thus, on the basis of this test, there
is no significant evidence of electoral fraud in the 2009 Afghan presidential election.
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Possibility 2: θ /∈ N: The first case was the familiar result from Newcomb (1881),
Benford (1938), and Mebane (2010). Newcomb (1881) and Benford (1938) allude to this
second (more general) case, but neither explored nor derived it.



























d+ 1 ≤ 10θ−bθc
and is continuous in θ.
Proof. With respect to the function, there are three cases. In the first case, the leading
digit of the upper bound of X is less than the digit under consideration. In the second
case, the leading digit of the upper bound of X is the digit under consideration. In the
third case, the leading digit of the upper bound of X is greater than the digit under
consideration.
Case 1 : In this case, the leading digit of the upper bound of X is less than the digit
under consideration.










































Case 2 : In this case, the leading digit of the upper bound of X is the digit under con-
sideration.




























































Case 3 : In this case, the leading digit of the upper bound of X is greater than the digit
under consideration.
































































The Theorem’s formula follows. Continuity follows from the function values at the end
points being equal.
If θ ∈ N, Theorem 2.7 reduces to Lemma 2.4, as it should. To see this, note that
θ = bθc when θ ∈ N and that 100 ≤ d for all d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 9}. The result follows from
being in Case 1 in the Lemma.
Both Newcomb and Benford proved their results in the case where the values of
X were unbounded; i.e. when θ → ∞. Using Theorem 2.7, we can now prove their
assertions differently.
Corollary 2.8. As θ →∞, the generalized Benford distribution converges in distribution
to the integer Benford distribution; that is, B1(0, θ)
L−→ B1(0, n), n ∈ N.
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Proof. From Theorem 2.7, P[D1(X) = d] varies between a lower bound at d = 10θ−bθc
and an upper bound at d+ 1 = 10θ−bθc.





























, as θ →∞.






























, as θ →∞.
Since the upper bound converges to the lower bound, the Two Policemen and a
Drunk Theorem (a.k.a. the Squeeze Theorem) tells us that B1(0, θ)
L−→ B1(0, n), n ∈ N,
as θ →∞.
Figure 2.5 provides a graphical display of the leading digit probabilities for values
of θ through θ = 6. The top graph demonstrates how the mean leading digit varies with
the value of θ. Note that E[D ]→ 3.440 as θ →∞.
Now that we have a sufficient grounding for the Benford distribution, it is time to
turn to its current limited use in electoral forensics.
2.3. The Benford test
Many fraud tests, such as the Benford test, are based on the assumption that humans are
either not random, or are incorrectly random. For example, were someone to provide a
listing of 1000 ‘H’ and ‘T’ values, it would be straightforward to test if the data resulted
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Figure 2.5: Means and probabilities for various values of θ. The top plot is the mean leading
digit; the bottom, leading digit probabilities with probabilities for the digit 1 at top, and the rest
in decreasing order.
from a thousand coin flips or if someone merely attempted to physically simulate 1000
coin flips. Aspects we could test on the coin flip data would include the numbers of
‘H’ entries, the average run length, and the distribution of run lengths. Under the null
hypothesis that the data were generated from a fair coin, we know the distribution of
each of the statistics.
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As such, we can determine the probability of observing such data were the null
hypothesis true. Were the data generated under the alternative hypothesis that they
were generated “randomly” by a human, we know from experience that the distribution
of the number of Heads is much more leptokurtotic (peaked) than it would be under the
null hypothesis and that the average run length will be much shorter.
This is the idea behind digit tests in electoral forensics. Election results, while not
coin flips, should also demonstrate some divergence from the expected null distribution if
they are tainted by vote-count fraud—by humans recording knowingly false vote counts
How can vote-count fraud take place? While all electoral systems are unique in
their specific structures, generalities can be made. Frequently, the votes are not counted
in a single, central location. Votes cast at the precinct level tend to be counted at the
precinct level, with vote counts forwarded to the national electoral commission, where
the totals are counted and the final announcements are made. The ballot papers are
later shipped to the national electoral commission (if at all).
Ghana follows this strategy. When the polling station closes, counting begins
there, in full view of candidate agents. When the ballots are counted, the totals are
recorded in the “Blue Book” for that polling station, with the candidate agents signing
off on the legitimacy of the count and receiving copies of the counts. Those vote counts
are then forwarded to the Electoral Commission of Ghana in Accra, which collects them,
totals them, and announces the official winners (Ghana 2012, §35).
Conversely, Afghanistan does not follow this process. In 2009, the polling places
sent all ballot papers to a central counting facility in Kabul (Afghanistan 2009a, Article
12). In such cases, it is much easier to perpetrate vote-count fraud; one merely has to
control the small group doing the centralized counting.
In countries like Afghanistan, changing the counts (or even creating false counts)
is relatively easy. The digit most likely changed is the lead digit, as that digit has the
most impact on the election. As mentioned above, rarely are humans correctly random.
22
They will attempt to force the appearance of randomness to hide their tracks, but they
will use the wrong distribution. That is, the distribution of vote counts in fraudulent
precincts is different than the distribution of vote counts in non-fraudulent districts.
The current digit test is the (integer) Benford test (Hill 1995; Mebane 2010).
According to the integer Benford distribution, the distribution of those first digits is






where d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 9} is the leading digit (see Lemma 2.4).
This distribution is used in forensic accounting to detect fraud in expense accounts
(Carslaw 1988; Cho and Gaines 2007; Nigrini 2011, 2012); in elections, to detect vote-
counting fraud (Mebane 2010). Theoretically, the distribution of the leading digit of
votes for a given candidate follows the integer Benford distribution. As humans tend to
randomize much more uniformly, vote-count fraud will produce a distribution different
from the Benford distribution. As such, a simple chi-squared test can be (and has been)
used to detect this type of election fraud (Carslaw 1988).
2.3.1 The Violated Assumption. However, this current test makes the assumption
that true vote counts follow the integer Benford distribution. Demonstrably, they do not,
as this section shows.
Recall that, by Lemma 2.4, when θ ∈ N or when θ →∞,





In elections, the upper bound 10θ is the size of the electoral division in which we are
counting the votes. It is unlikely that the division size will be an integer power of 10
or that the district sizes will be sufficiently large for the asymptotic results (Figure 2.6).
Thus, it is unlikely that the integer Benford distribution will hold in true vote counts.
Finally, also note that we had to assume the distribution of the vote counts was
Log-uniform (Figure 2.2). Vote counts are a product of electoral division size and pro-
portion vote for the candidate. In countries with division sizes approximately following
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Figure 2.6: The probability the leading digit is a ‘1’ for various upper bounds on the Log-
uniform distribution. Note that there is much variation, and the value 0.301 is the exact prob-
ability only when the upper bound is an integer power of 10.
an Exponential distribution, such as in the United States (Figure 2.7, top panel), this
requirement reduces to assuming the proportion of the vote for a given candidate is
Uniformly distributed across the electoral divisions. Such an outcome would be quite
surprising. More likely is that the distribution of proportions is unimodal, bell-shaped,
and bounded between 0 and 1, much like the empirical distribution shown in Figure 2.7,
bottom panel.
That raises the question of how good the Benford distribution could be at detect-
ing vote-counting fraud in elections. Hill (1995) concluded that the Benford distribution
is the limiting distribution of sums of random distributions. Are vote counts the sums of
distributions? Yes. However, how many electoral divisions are needed for Hill’s asymp-
totic results to hold?
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Figure 2.7: Top panel: Distribution of electoral divisions (counties) in the United States. The
vertical axis is logged frequency to show better the distribution of division sizes. Note that the
distribution is similar to the Exponential distribution. Bottom panel: Distribution of proportion
of vote in support of Barack Obama in the 2008 US presidential election, by electoral division.
Note that this distribution is not Uniform.
2.3.2 Weaknesses. To test if the integer Benford test is appropriate for election
counts, let us use the results from the 2008 US presidential election. This datafile con-
tains the final vote counts at the county level for every state except for Alaska (n = 3114
divisions). The number of counties per state ranges from 3 for Delaware to 254 for Texas.
The total number of cast ballots in each county ranges from 79 in Loving County, Texas,
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Figure 2.8: A box-and-whiskers plot of electoral division sizes in the 2008 US presidential
election. Solid dots represent outliers using the 1.5 rule.
to 2,818,964 in Los Angeles County, California. Figure 2.8 is a box-and-whiskers plot of
the distribution of electoral district sizes. Note that the horizontal scale is logarithmic.
To illustrate the appropriateness of the Benford test, let us now determine if the
United States, as a whole, passes the test with the number of votes for John McCain.
First, here is a table of the expected and observed proportions of leading digits at the
division level.
Digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Expected 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.051 0.046
Observed 0.290 0.169 0.127 0.105 0.083 0.070 0.059 0.050 0.047
Now, using Pearson’s Chi-squared test (Pearson 1900), we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that the data follows the Benford distribution (χ2 = 5.8188, ν = 8, p = 0.6675).
Additionally, the mean digit is 3.497, which is well within the simulated 95% confidence
interval (3.354, 3.527) as well as the symmetric 95% confidence interval derived from the
Normal approximation, (3.354, 3.526).
In the United States, election laws and procedures vary at the state level; the
presidential election is actually 51 separate elections. Thus, a better assessment of this
test is to examine each state for a violation of the integer Benford law. Unfortunately,
the number of counties in several states makes the Chi-squared test inappropriate due
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to the small expected cell counts (Conover 1999; Pearson 1900; Rice 2007; Yates 1934).
Focusing on states whose cell counts all exceed 3 and performing the integer Benford
test on the remaining 23 states, we have three states violating the Benford test at the
α = 0.05 level: Illinois, Iowa, and Mississippi. Were this test a level-α test, we would
expect 1.15 states violating.
The 2004 US presidential election has even more states violating the Benford test.
Of the 28 states with a sufficient number of counties, seven violated the Benford test at
the α = 0.05 level: Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Texas, and Vermont.
Were this a level-α test, we would expect only 1.4 states violating.
Between these two elections, we have 10 violations in 51 tests. Under the Binomial
assumptions, such an outcome would be highly unlikely, happening in fewer than 1 in
5000 cases. Thus, if we do assume the two US Presidential elections were free from
vote-counting fraud, we have prima facie evidence that this is not an appropriate test of
electoral fairness.
2.4. Improvements to the Benford Test
There are two major weaknesses to the integer Benford Test. The first weakness is that
it assumes the upper bound of the underlying Uniform distribution (the division size)
is either an integer power of 10 or is large enough for us to rely on asymptotic results.
Unfortunately, the first is unlikely, and the second is not true for reasonable division sizes
(cf. Figures 2.5 and 2.6, where there are still large variations in probabilities even when
the division size is one million).
The second weakness is that the Benford test assumes the vote count follows a
specific distribution—the Log-uniform distribution. There is little research regarding the
distribution of votes in a free and fair election. Deckert et al. (2011) create a hierarchical
probability model to simulate fraud-free election counts. They then used these elections
to determine the suitability of the integer Benford test. However, even they acknowledge
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that “there is no proscribed [sic] model of an election with which to begin the generation
of artificial data” (Deckert et al. 2011, p 249).
Thus, improving upon the Benford test in this setting requires avoiding these two
weaknesses. Generalizing the integer Benford test to incorporate the turnout in each di-
vision separately avoids the first weakness; removing or altering the current distributional
assumption, the second.
2.4.1 The Generalized Benford Test. The integer Benford test assumes that the
size of the electoral division either is an integer power of ten or is sufficiently large for
asymptotic results to hold. Neither assumption reflects reality. Thus, a first correction
would be to apply Theorem 2.7 separately to each division. Tests that center on this
adjustment I term “generalized Benford tests,” of which the integer Benford test is a
special case.
Note that the above paragraph introduces one difficulty: How do we combine these
n different leading digits with n different distributions into a single test statistic with a
known—or even knowable—distribution?
I suggest two methods for implementing the class of generalized Benford tests:
the likelihood simulation method and the multinomial averaging method. Assessment of
these tests will wait until Section 2.5
The Likelihood Simulation Method: One method, albeit computationally inten-
sive, to unify these n tests is to create a test statistic and determine its distribution
through simulation. This I propose here, using the probability of observing the individ-
ual leading digits in each electoral division as that test statistic.
Let us define θi such that 10
θi is the total number of votes cast in electoral division
i. Let ci be the vote count in electoral division i for a specific candidate, and let di :=
D1(ci) be the leading digit of this vote count. If the leading digit follows the generalized
Benford distribution, then the probability mass function in division i is given by Theorem
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2.7, with θ indexed by the electoral division, i. The likelihood of observing these data











To estimate the distribution of the log-likelihood, one generates a leading digit in
each division according to the generalized Benford distribution. The probabilities of each
of those generated leading digits are multiplied together to create the likelihood value
for a single election. Performing this multiple times allows one to estimate (1− α)100%
confidence intervals for the likelihood value.
As a first example, let us turn to the 2008 US Presidential election in Oklahoma.
The vote counts are aggregated to the county level (n = 77). The observed log-likelihood
is −65.3186. Using simulation with 10,000 replications, an estimated 95% confidence
interval is from −70 to −59. Thus, by this test, there is no evidence of vote count fraud
in the 2008 US Presidential election in Oklahoma—as expected.
As a second example, let us examine the 2009 Afghan Presidential election. Recall
that these votes are aggregated at the wilāyat level, n = 34. The observed log-likelihood
is −28.93255. An estimated 95% confidence interval is from −32 to −25. Thus, this test
also offers no evidence of vote count fraud in this election.
Note again that this section merely offers a proof-of-concept for the test. It does
not offer evidence of its applicability beyond the fact that the test seems reasonable. In
a later section, I explore the Type I and the Type II Error rates (Section 2.5) of this test.
Multinomial Averaging: In lieu of using simulation to estimate the distribution of
a test statistic, we can estimate the test statistic in another way. Recall that the leading
digit in each electoral division has a different distribution, which is a function of θi. That
these θi are usually unique makes creating the correct distribution quite difficult.
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Ramachandran (1956) introduced the Union-Intersection method for cases in which
the null hypothesis is the intersection of several independent component null hypotheses
(Berger and Sinclair 1984; Casella and Berger 2002). This method reduces the problem
of testing the composite null hypothesis to testing each individual component hypothesis
at an appropriately selected level. Unfortunately, unless two or more electoral divisions
share a vote total, the rejection region in each division is empty; that is, the symmetric
95% confidence interval includes all nine digits. As such, the Union-Intersection method
is not helpful in this situation.
However, two simple methods present themselves in terms of combining the n
electoral division distributions into one.
Note that the distribution of digits in each division is a Multinomial distribution,
with each distribution being a function of θi. That is, define πi as the vector of digit





D1(X) ∼ Multi (1,π∗) .
The remaining problem is to determine the vector π∗. Note that D1(·) is the leading
digit function (Definition 2.2).
First : Perhaps the simplest method is to average the θi and use this value to
calculate the π∗ values from the Benford distribution. The main advantage to this
method is that the calculation is performed easily. The main disadvantage is that there
is no guarantee the true digit distribution follows a Benford distribution; this method
forces it. Regardless, I test its performance later.
Second : Another simple method to estimate π∗ is to calculate the mean of the
digit distributions in the n divisions. Two advantages of this estimation procedure are
that the calculation is simple and that the resulting digit distribution is not constrained
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to be a member of the Benford family. The drawback is that the arithmetic average will
only be an estimate of the true π∗. However, because of its advantages, I also test its
performance.
Nine-dimensional Tests: The previous subsection covered two methods of producing
a hypothesized null distribution with the understanding that the data would be compared
to it. Unfortunately this is an eight-dimensional problem in that we are projecting the
nine-dimensional observation space onto a one-dimensional testing space. The default
methods seem to be Pearson’s Chi-squared test (Pearson 1900) and the likelihood ratio
test (Neyman and Pearson 1933). However, are these the best methods in this setting?
Cressie and Read (1984) asserted that Pearson’s Chi-squared test is a special case
of the larger family of power-divergence tests, of which the likelihood ratio test is also a












where λ ∈ R is a parameter selecting the specific form of the test, xi is the ith observed
value, and µi is the ith expected value. When λ = 1, we have Pearson’s Chi-squared
statistic, X2. When λ→ 0, we have the usual likelihood ratio statistic, G2. Cressie and
Read (1984) suggest that the statistic with λ = 2
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tends to be superior to either of the
above two options. All members of the power-divergence family have the same limiting
Chi-squared distribution (Read and Cressie 1988, p 47).
Such tests are not the only way of projecting nine dimensions into one. Another
method is to focus on the p-values from the individual nine tests and select just the
minimum, the min-p. However, due to multiple testing issues, one would have to adjust
this value in some manner. The default method is the Bonferroni adjustment where
the calculated p-values are multiplied by the number of tests performed, k (Holm 1979).
While this does protect the experiment-wise rejection rate, it is conservative—especially
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when the p-values are discrete random variables, as is the case here (Murdoch et al. 2008;
Westfall and Wolfinger 1997).
There is an adjustment procedure that takes into consideration the discreteness
of the p-values, creating a higher power than the Bonferroni adjustment, while still
protecting the experiment-wise error rate. The Westfall-Wolfinger min-p test (a Union-








Here, the Pi are the p-values (random variables) of the k tests, and pj is the smallest
observed p-value, which corresponds to that of the jth test.
Following Westfall and Wolfinger (1997), let us further define pi as the observed
p-value of the ith test and pit as the observable p-values of the i
th test. With this, and
with the definition of the p-value, we have pit = P[Pi ≤ pit]. Since the p-value is defined
as the probability under the null hypothesis of observing data this extreme (or more so),
we can define
pit(j) :=
 maxt {pit, s.t. pit ≤ pj} if mint {pit} ≤ pj0 Otherwise (2.2)
as the p-value of each of the ith tests, as a function of the minimum observed p-value (in







As this holds for all observed p-values, it also holds for the minimum of the observed
p-values. And so, to create the most powerful test of this class, one need only calculate
p′j for the digit with the smallest p-value.
For the current situation of digit tests on n electoral divisions, both i and j range
from 1 to 9, and t ranges from 0 to n. The annex to this chapter has the R-code for this
test (see page 59).
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Freq. Digit 1 Digit 2 Digit 3 Digit 4 Digit 5 Digit 6 Digit 7 Digit 8 Digit 9
(t) p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
0 0.559 0.641* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000 1.000*
1 1.000* 1.000 0.330 0.263 0.219 0.188 0.164 0.146 0.131
2 0.217 0.082 0.043 0.026 0.018 0.013 0.010 0.008* 0.006
3 0.027 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 2.2: Table of observable p-values for the example in the text. Starred p-values are
observed. The red p-value is the minimum of the observed p-values.
To illustrate this test, let us examine a toy example in which there are only three
electoral divisions. The vote counts in the divisions are 1405, 8037, and 8204. Using
reflected tail probabilities for a two-tailed test (Westfall and Wolfinger 1997), we have
the observable p-values given in Table 2.2. Starred values are observed p-values given
the observed data.
According to Table 2.2, we have:
i = 1, 2, . . . , 9
j = 8








Note that this adjusted p-value is less than the one would calculate using the
Bonferroni adjustment (p = 0.008× 9 = 0.072). In fact, one would fail to reject the null
hypothesis that the leading digit follows the Benford distribution when using the Benford
test. One would reject the null hypothesis using the Westfall and Wolfinger min-p test.
And so, we are left with the question of which test is most appropriate and when.
To determine this, I test the level and power of these four tests: Pearson’s Chi-squared
test (λ = 1), the likelihood ratio test (λ→ 0), Read and Cressie’s suggested test (λ = 2
3
),
and Westfall and Wolfinger’s min-p test. The results of the level tests (Figure 2.9) suggest
that two of the four tests are conservative. The Read and Cressie test is only slightly
conservative. The likelihood ratio test is highly conservative when the number of divisions
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Figure 2.9: A plot of the estimated sizes of the four tests when α = 0.05 for four sample
sizes. In each, the 95% confidence intervals are shown as rectangles. The number of iterations
to estimate the Type I Error rate is B = 1, 000, 000. Note the issue the likelihood ratio test, G2,
has when the digit frequencies in bins are small.
is low, reducing as the number of divisions increases. Both the Chi-squared test and the
min-p test are very close to being level-α tests.
To test power, I specify two alternative distributions: the discrete Uniform distri-
bution and a shifted Benford distribution. The first alternative distribution would arise
from people fabricating the vote counts; the second, from adding one to the leading digit.
With these two alternative distributions, the power-testing program parameters
are
 The null distribution is H : D ∼ B1(0, n), with n ∈ N.
 The alternative distributions are
Ku : D ∼ U(1, 9),
Ks : D ∼ Bs1(0, n).
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 The mixing parameter, ξ varies from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.10.
 The sample size, n, varies from 25 to 100 in increments of 25.
 The four tests are performed and the rejection rate is calculated for each at the
α = 0.05 level based on B = 100, 000 trials.
Running this in R would have taken days. Thus, I wrote the code in FORTRAN 90 and
enjoyed a nice cup of Kenyan coffee while it ran.
Figure 2.10 displays the estimated power curves for each of the tests as functions
of the mixing parameter, with the sample size held at 75. One thing is notable here: the
venerable Chi-squared test is superior to the other tests for detecting uniform contami-
nation; the Westfall and Wolfinger min-p test, for detecting Shift contamination. Both
will need to be used.
2.4.2 The Empirical Benford Tests. The previous methods still assume that the
vote counts have a specific distribution—the Log-uniform distribution. If we are not
comfortable assuming this distribution for vote counts (Deckert et al. 2011), we have
options. First, we could change the assumed distribution. Second, we could eliminate
the distributional assumption completely and use non-parametric methods.
The Parametric Empirical Benford Test: The parametric empirical Benford test
generates multiple “elections” based on the distribution of the proportion of the vote in
favor of a specified candidate and calculates the distribution of leading digits according to
this electoral system. In one manner, this method is similar to the likelihood simulation
method for the generalized Benford test (Section 2.4.1); simulation is used to determine
an important distribution. Here, however, that important distribution is the distribution
of leading digits. The difficult parts comes down to generating elections from the given
data.
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Figure 2.10: A plot of the estimated power curves for each of the four tests when α = 0.05
and n = 75. The number of Monte Carlo iterations is B = 10, 000. This corresponds to an
estimated margin of error of ±0.01.
Let us recall the bottom panel of Figure 2.7 on page 25. As in this case, the distri-
bution of vote proportions for a specified candidate often follow a unimodal distribution
with support in (0, 1). While there are several distributions matching these requirements,
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distribution for µ = 0.60 and for four
values of σ.
one helpful distribution is the Logit-normal distribution (Johnson 1949).
Definition 2.9 (Logit-normal distribution). Let Y ∼ N (µ, σ). We say X := logitY has
a Logit-normal distribution, symbolized as X ∼ LgtN (µ, σ2), with support X ∈ (0, 1).












Its cumulative distribution function is






where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard Normal distribution.
Figure 2.11 provides plots of Logit-normal distributions for four values of σ with µ = 0.60.
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Alas, the moments of the Logit-normal distribution lack analytic solutions unless
µ = 0.500. Regardless, calculations of these moments are straightforward using numerical
methods and statistical packages (Frederic and Lad 2008; Johnson 1949; Wutzler 2012).
An advantage of the Logit-normal distribution over the more common Beta distribution
is that a logit transformation of the Logit-normal distribution produces a Normal distri-
bution, and the Normal distribution frequently has better properties (both mathematical
and statistical) than the Beta distribution.
In terms of the parametric empirical Benford test, this distribution serves as the
generator distribution for the proportion of vote in favor of the candidate in each electoral
division. The process of generating elections is typical for simulation studies:
1. The µ and σ2 parameters are calculated from the data;
2. a random draw of length n from a Logit-normal LgtN (µ, σ2) distribution is pro-
duced;
3. element-wise multiplying this vector by the vector of division sizes produces vote
counts produces a pseudo-election; finally
4. from this pseudo-election, a leading digit distribution is calculated.
Repeating this process increases the precision of the leading digit distribution. Comparing
the observed leading digit distribution to this empirically-generated distribution is the
test. The comparison test should be the min-p test or Pearson’s Chi-square test (see
§2.4.1).
For instance, let us return to the 2008 US presidential election. Figure 2.12 pro-
vides a histogram of the vote proportion for candidate John McCain in all US counties,
overlain by the Logit-normal LgtN (µ = 0.298, σ = 0.616) distribution.
In this election, a total of 3114 electoral divisions reported vote counts, with
division sizes ranging from 79 (Loving County, TX) to 2, 819, 000 (Los Angeles County,
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Figure 2.12: Histogram of McCain support by county in the United States overlaid with the
Logit-normal LgtN (µ = 0.298, σ = 0.616) distribution.
CA). In this election, electoral divisions tended to be counties; however, some states
reported at other levels, such as cities and townships. With B = 10, 000 replications,
the table below provides the expected distribution and observed proportions of leading
digits.
Digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Expected 0.286 0.175 0.129 0.102 0.084 0.070 0.059 0.051 0.045
Observed 0.290 0.169 0.127 0.105 0.083 0.070 0.059 0.050 0.047
Figure 2.13 displays the expected frequency of the leading digits as well as the observed
frequencies. The Pearson Chi-squared test indicates that the observed digit distribution
does not significantly deviate from the expected digit distribution (X2 = 1.43; p = 0.994).
This conclusion is echoed by the generalized likelihood test (G2 = 0.716; p = 0.999) and
Read & Cressie’s test (RC = 1.43; p = 0.994). The min-p test also concurs (p′ = 0.994).
In all four cases, there is no sufficient evidence for vote-counting fraud.
As a second example, let us revisit the Afghan 2009 Presidential election. Re-
call that a total of 34 wilāyet reported vote counts in this election, with division sizes
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Figure 2.13: Graphic of expected versus observed leading digit frequencies for John McCain’s
votes in the 2008 US Presidential election using the parametric empirical Benford test.
ranging from 11, 300 to 152, 800. Using 10, 000 replications, the expected and observed
distribution of leading digits is given in the table below.
Digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Expected 0.295 0.182 0.120 0.104 0.084 0.069 0.057 0.049 0.042
Observed 0.265 0.235 0.059 0.147 0.118 0.059 0.088 0.029 0.000
Figure 2.14 displays the expected frequency of the leading digits as well as the observed
frequencies. The Pearson Chi-squared test indicates that the observed digit distribution
does not significantly deviate from the expected digit distribution (X2 = 5.09; p = 0.747).
Because of the zero count, the generalized likelihood statistic does not exist. The Read
and Cressie test concurs with the conclusion of the Chi-squared test (RC = 5.37; p =
0.717). The min-p test also suggests no significant evidence of vote-count fraud (p′ =
0.905).
The advantage of the parametric empirical Benford test is that it removes the
assumption that the vote counts have a Log-uniform distribution. There are two disad-
vantages. The first is that this test is of low power (see Section 2.5). The second is that
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Figure 2.14: Graphic of expected versus observed leading digit frequencies for Hamid Karzai’s
votes in the 2009 Afghan Presidential election using the parametric empirical Benford test.
it makes the assumption that the vote proportions follow the Logit-normal distribution.
There is little extant research regarding the a priori distribution of vote proportions. To
adjust the test for this concern, I next relax this last assumption.
The Non-Parametric Empirical Benford Test: Non-parametric tests are used
when the distribution of the data is not known, such as here. The non-parametric
empirical Benford test is very similar to the parametric empirical Benford test in that
the expected distribution of leading digits is generated through simulation. The primary
difference is that the simulated vote proportions are randomly drawn from the real vote
proportions rather than from the Logit-normal distribution. Thus, the steps are
1. Generate a random sample of length n from the vote proportions, with replacement;
2. create vote counts for a pseudo-election by element-wise multiplying the vote-
proportion vector by the division-size vector; and
3. calculate the leading-digit distribution from this pseudo-election.
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As before, repeating this process increases the precision of the empirical leading digit
distribution, and the statistical test can be done using the min-p test or a member of the
power-deviance family of tests (Section 2.4.1, above).
2.5. The Alpha and the Beta
In this chapter, I have covered several current and proposed digit tests. Which of these
tests, if any, should be used and under which circumstances? This question can be
answered by looking at the level and power of each test.
For a test to be of level α, the rejection rate under the null hypothesis should not
exceed α. Investigating the level of the test requires that we know the distribution of
a free and fair election. Unfortunately, Political Science has not advanced to the point
that there is a known distribution for vote counts (Deckert et al. 2011). In lieu of using a
hypothesized distribution of a free and fair election, I shall use the vote counts generated
from an election I assume is fair. This election is the US Presidential election of 2008—
the full complement of the 50 states excluding those reporting fewer than five electoral
divisions in the election. This collection offers divisions of several sizes and elections with
different numbers of divisions.
As discussed in Section 1.3, I extract the division size and the proportion of the
vote in that division cast for John McCain—the candidate of the incumbent party. I
then permute the proportions and multiply them by the division sizes. Repeating this
created multiple elections. The R code is provided in the Annex 2 (Section 2.8).
With these assumedly free and fair elections, we can estimate the size of each of
the tests of this chapter. In the next two sections, I demonstrate this with the likelihood
simulation and the multinomial averaging methods by investigating their level.
In terms of estimating the power of the tests, not only is a “null” distribution
required (the distribution of vote counts from a free and fair election), but so is an
“alternative” distribution—vote counts from an election demonstrating a lack of fairness.
42
The null distribution will be as above. The alternative distributions will either be the
uniform contamination or the spike contamination (Section 2.4.1, page 34), depending
on the test’s power.
2.5.1 The Likelihood Simulation Method. Recall from Section 2.4.1 (page 28),
the Likelihood Simulation method calculates the likelihood of observing the reported
leading digits and compares that likelihood to the distribution of likelihoods generated
from simulation of the data. The likelihoods are based on the generalized Benford dis-
tribution. The algorithm for a single test is
1. Determine the division size, 10θi , for each division;
2. Generate an ‘election’ of digits based on θi for each division using the generalized
Benford distribution; and
3. Calculate the log-likelihood of this ‘election.’
Repeating these steps a sufficient number of times allows one to more precisely esti-
mate the distribution of the log-likelihood, against which one compares the observed
log-likelihood. Performing this test for the 47 elections of 2004 and the 47 elections of
2008 above gives the results mapped in Figure 2.15. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 provide the results
for each of the 94 elections.
For these 94 elections, 10 of the observed likelihoods fall outside the 95% confidence
interval. This corresponds to an observed rejection rate (at α = 0.05) of 0.1064, which is
more than twice the expected rejection rate. Assuming the tests are independent, which
would imply the number of rejections would be Binomially distributed, there should be
no more than nine rejections, corresponding to a rejection rate of 0.0957. The p-value
for the hypothesis that the rejection rate is actually α = 0.05 is 0.02311. Thus, this is
an improper test, rejecting at a higher rate than it should. Admittedly, given the origin
of the test, it is not as poor as expected.
43
Election(s) Divisions Lower Bound Upper Bound Measured
Alabama 67 -61.75 -51.93 -58.25
Arizona 15 -15.08 -10.39 -11.97
Arkansas 75 -68.57 -57.97 -60.45
California 58 -53.87 -44.60 -47.44
Colorado 64 -59.03 -49.14 -54.91
Connecticut 169 -150.48 -134.69 -151.35 X
Florida 67 -61.81 -52.08 -58.00
Georgia 159 -141.77 -126.43 -135.37
Idaho 44 -41.14 -32.93 -35.65
Illinois 102 -92.41 -80.08 -88.18
Indiana 92 -83.84 -72.35 -84.65 X
Iowa 99 -89.72 -77.73 -88.74
Kansas 105 -94.66 -81.98 -83.16
Kentucky 120 -107.71 -94.43 -104.48
Louisiana 64 -59.14 -49.46 -57.74
Maine 511 -439.14 -411.04 -433.45
Maryland 24 -23.31 -17.42 -20.04
Massachusetts 351 -306.96 -283.74 -298.42
Michigan 83 -75.82 -64.83 -76.26 X
Minnesota 87 -79.18 -67.88 -74.09
Mississippi 82 -74.98 -64.14 -77.27 X
Missouri 115 -103.53 -90.62 -96.38
Montana 56 -51.73 -42.31 -43.67
Nebraska 93 -83.98 -71.85 -74.08
Nevada 17 -16.87 -11.74 -12.13
New Hampshire 237 -207.72 -188.17 -194.55
New Jersey 21 -20.55 -15.09 -18.94
New Mexico 33 -31.41 -24.34 -27.01
New York 62 -57.23 -47.65 -47.42 X
North Carolina 100 -90.60 -78.47 -83.82
North Dakota 53 -49.22 -40.16 -43.92
Ohio 88 -80.27 -68.90 -70.53
Oklahoma 77 -70.29 -59.44 -60.05
Oregon 36 -34.11 -26.90 -34.59 X
Pennsylvania 67 -61.69 -51.75 -51.15 X
Rhode Island 39 -36.90 -29.21 -33.77
South Carolina 46 -43.15 -35.11 -40.17
South Dakota 66 -60.59 -50.53 -54.81
Tennessee 95 -86.26 -74.45 -79.42
Texas 254 -224.16 -204.53 -215.89
Utah 29 -27.76 -21.18 -25.59
Vermont 246 -215.25 -195.29 -212.64
Virginia 134 -120.20 -106.30 -116.56
Washington 39 -36.95 -29.18 -31.56
West Virginia 55 -51.03 -42.00 -47.13
Wyoming 23 -22.33 -16.46 -19.01
Wisconsin 72 -66.20 -56.05 -60.86
Table 2.3: Table of Type I Error rates for the Likelihood Simulation Method for the 2004 US
Presidential election. The number of repetitions was B = 10, 000.
44
Election(s) Divisions Lower Bound Upper Bound Measured
Alabama 67 -61.77 -51.98 -61.40
Arizona 15 -15.08 -10.45 -12.73
Arkansas 75 -68.51 -57.92 -62.20
California 58 -53.87 -44.61 -51.14
Colorado 64 -59.04 -49.13 -55.92
Connecticut 8 -8.47 -5.22 -5.87
Florida 67 -61.82 -52.11 -59.54
Georgia 159 -142.01 -126.68 -139.02
Idaho 44 -41.16 -32.96 -35.42
Illinois 102 -92.42 -80.14 -92.65 X
Indiana 92 -83.83 -72.30 -85.58 X
Iowa 99 -89.67 -77.72 -86.17
Kansas 105 -94.76 -82.12 -82.39
Kentucky 120 -107.72 -94.37 -102.39
Louisiana 64 -59.16 -49.52 -58.78
Maine 16 -16.00 -11.13 -14.42
Maryland 24 -23.30 -17.42 -19.86
Massachusetts 14 -14.14 -9.69 -11.46
Michigan 83 -75.84 -64.84 -74.43
Minnesota 87 -79.13 -67.84 -75.15
Mississippi 82 -75.01 -64.18 -76.87 X
Missouri 115 -103.54 -90.58 -94.62
Montana 56 -51.74 -42.36 -43.01
Nebraska 93 -83.98 -71.86 -75.81
Nevada 17 -16.86 -11.72 -12.14
New Hampshire 10 -10.37 -6.57 -8.81
New Jersey 21 -20.54 -15.07 -18.82
New Mexico 33 -31.39 -24.34 -26.93
New York 62 -57.25 -47.69 -48.25
North Carolina 100 -90.71 -78.59 -84.75
North Dakota 53 -49.25 -40.21 -46.99
Ohio 88 -80.20 -68.82 -70.51
Oklahoma 77 -70.32 -59.44 -59.75
Oregon 36 -34.24 -26.97 -33.19
Pennsylvania 67 -61.68 -51.75 -52.76
Rhode Island 5 -5.60 -2.93 -4.71
South Carolina 46 -43.17 -35.09 -42.18
South Dakota 66 -60.58 -50.57 -55.90
Tennessee 95 -86.25 -74.40 -78.52
Texas 254 -224.01 -204.46 -213.12
Utah 29 -27.76 -21.17 -24.58
Vermont 14 -14.13 -9.52 -13.63
Virginia 134 -120.24 -106.43 -115.75
Washington 39 -36.91 -29.18 -31.23
West Virginia 55 -51.05 -41.91 -44.93
Wisconsin 72 -66.18 -56.04 -63.67
Wyoming 23 -22.33 -16.47 -17.44
Table 2.4: Table of Type I Error rates for the Likelihood Simulation Method for the 2008 US
Presidential election. The number of repetitions was B = 10, 000.
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Figure 2.15: Table of Type I Error rates for the Likelihood Simulation Method in these elec-
tions. The average rejection rate for these elections is 0.1065.
To continue exploring the rejection rates for real elections, I performed this test
on 10 additional elections. Table 2.5 provides the estimated p-value for each of those
10 elections. There were claims of electoral fraud in only the Afghan and Romanian
elections. The Afghan election easily passed this test; neither Romanian election did.
Unfortunately, both Irish elections and the Norwegian election soundly failed. I would
say this constitutes prima facie evidence that the test is problematic.
I now turn to estimating the power of this test. The fully-contaminated election
will be the US 2008 election with leading digits shifted. To estimate power, I create
mixtures of the null election and this fully adulterated election, varying the contamination
level. From this, I can estimate the rejection rate at each contamination level.
Figure 2.16 provides a plot of the calculated p-values for each election tested using
this test (green dots) and the proportion of those which are below α = 0.05 (curve). Note
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State Year Election LST
Afghanistan 2009 President 0.992
Egypt 2011 Referendum 0.329
Ireland 2011 Parliament 0.000
Ireland 2012 Referendum 0.000
Lithuania 2009 President 0.851
Macedonia 2011 Parliament 0.388
Norway 2009 Parliament 0.009
Romania 2009 President (Round 1) 0.000
Romania 2009 President (Round 2) 0.000
United States 2004 President 0.939
Table 2.5: Results for the Likelihood Simulation test performed on 10 real elections. The LST
column provides p-values estimated by this method. Only in the Afghan and Romanian elections
was fraud alleged.
that the contamination rates tested range from 0.00 to 0.10, not the usual 0.00 to 1.00
range.
Because the power is approximately 1.00 when the shift contamination is at 6%
(ξ = 0.06), this test is very sensitive to the shift contamination. This may explain the
Irish and Norwegian results in Table 2.5. There is little room for deviation from the
assumed distribution before the test rejects the null hypothesis.
2.5.2 Multinomial Averaging. Recall from Section 2.4.1 on page 29, that I propose
two methods for implementing the multinomial averaging procedure, two ways of esti-
mating the distribution of the leading digits. The first method uses the average division
size to construct the expected distribution of leading digits (MA1). The second method
averages the expected leading digit frequencies across the electoral divisions (MA2). In
both cases, if the division sizes are known, the final distribution does not change (Figure
2.17).
To test the power of these methods, I simulated elections and performed the tests,
determining the rejection rate for various alternative distributions. The null elections
(distributions) were the observed 2008 Presidential election results from 47 US states.
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Figure 2.16: Plot of calculated p-values and the resulting power curve for the Likelihood
Simulation Method in these elections. There are 1000 elections tested at each contamination
level.
From those vote counts, I replaced the leading digit with the next higher digit, repre-
senting the shift contamination. These are the fully contaminated elections, where all
electoral divisions are tainted.
As I am interested in the power of the test, I created nine additional sets of
elections blending the null and the fully-contaminated elections, where the blending rate
ranged from 0% to 15%, in steps of 1%. Thus, each of the 47 states had 10 “alternative”
sets of elections. Each set of elections contained 10,000 individual elections.
I performed the two versions of the multinomial averaging procedure, MA1 and
MA2, on each of the generated elections using Pearson’s Chi-square test. Figure 2.17
shows the expected digit distributions for the MA1 and MA2 version. Note that the two
distribution are very similar. The largest differences occur for digits 2 through 4.
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Figure 2.17: A plot of the expected digit distributions for the two versions of the Multinomial
Averaging test, MA1 and MA2. Note that their biggest differences are in digits 2 through 4.
Figure 2.18 provides the estimated power curves for these two varieties of the
Multinomial Averaging test. The MA2 version has higher power. Note, too, that the
contamination ranges from 0 to 15%, not to 100%. This test is also very sensitive to
deviations from the expected digit distribution.
I used both versions of this test on the same 10 elections from earlier (Table 2.5),
summarizing the results in Table 2.6. Note that the substantive conclusions are largely
the same. The only difference is that the MA1 test no longer finds Norway’s election
irregular. The two questionable Romanian elections remain highly significant.
Conclusion: In concluding this section, I make the following observations about these
three generalized Benford tests. First, the tests are extremely sensitive to violations of
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Figure 2.18: A plot of the power curves for the two versions, MA1 and MA2. Note that the
MA2 version has a higher power against shift contamination. The number of iterations at each
contamination level is 10,000.
the assumed null distribution. This means that we are very dependent on knowing the
“correct” digit distribution. Assuming that all US states held free and fair elections in
2004 and 2008, the Likelihood Simulation method had a Type I Error rate double what
it should have had.
Extending this to several foreign elections, the Likelihood Simulation test rejected
three elections that I would contend were also free and fair. Also, while it did flag the
two Romanian presidential elections as questionable, the type of fraud alleged in that
election is not the type of fraud that this method is designed to detect.
The two Multinomial Averaging tests were also very sensitive to deviations from
the expected digit distribution, with MA2 being the more sensitive. The MA1 test flagged
the Irish elections, but not the Norwegian general election; the MA2 test flagged all three.
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State Year Election MA1 MA2
Afghanistan 2009 President 0.625 0.609
Egypt 2011 Referendum 0.712 0.650
Ireland 2011 Parliament 0.000 0.000
Ireland 2012 Referendum 0.005 0.005
Lithuania 2009 President 0.004 0.003
Macedonia 2011 Parliament 0.559 0.523
Norway 2009 Parliament 0.161 0.035
Romania 2009 President (Round 1) 0.000 0.000
Romania 2009 President (Round 2) 0.000 0.000
United States 2004 President 0.811 0.847
Table 2.6: Results for the two Multinomial Averaging tests performed on 10 real elections.
The MA1 and MA2 columns provide the p-values. Only in the Afghan and Romanian elections
was fraud alleged. However, it was not the type that this test is designed to detect.
Thus, there remain large questions about the applicability of any of these three
tests. They are powerful against the null distribution, but questions remain whether that
null distribution is the correct distribution. In the next section, we relax the distribu-
tional assumption.
2.5.3 The Empirical Benford Tests. In addition to these two generalized Benford
tests, I estimate the size and power of the two empirical Benford tests—parametric and
non-parametric. These are both Monte Carlo tests, requiring much computing power
(and time). Abstractly, the two Monte Carlo tests are the same. They differ only in how
the simulated elections are generated. In the parametric version, the election proportions
are generated from the Logit-Normal distribution; in the non-parametric version, from
the observed proportions.
Parametric Results: To determine the power of this test, I need to first estimate the
critical value for the test. The following is the code I used to estimate those critical values.
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usN = usd$MCCAIN + usd$OBAMA + usd$OTHER
usP = usC/usN
n = length(usN)
lgm = mean( logit(usP) )
lgs = sd ( logit(usP) )
TS = matrix(NA,ncol=1,nrow=1e4)
for(m in 1:1e4) {






quantile(TS,c(0.025,0.975)) ## The estimated CVs
Figure 2.19 is the estimated distribution of the test statistic in this case. A
95% confidence interval is from 4.36 to 22.30, on one-million iterations. These limits
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are close to those estimated in the non-parametric case (below). The main difference
between the parametric and the non-parametric script is Line 10. In this case, the
election proportions are drawn from a Logit-Normal distribution; in the non-parametric
case, from the observed US vote proportions.
There are three variables measured from the US election: candidate vote, total
vote, and candidate proportion. The contamination is replacing each leading digit in the
candidate vote with a “1.” I attempted other types of contamination, but the power of
the test for these other contaminations (shift and uniform) was always lower. I varied
the contamination level from 0 to 100% in steps of 10%. For each contamination level, I
estimated the rejection rate by performing 1000 Monte Carlo tests. Figure 2.20 is a plot
of the estimated powers.
Note that the power is never “high.” As expected, it takes on a maximum value
at 100% contamination, but that value is an anemic 0.17.
Non-Parametric Results: Where the parametric test drew the simulated election
proportions from the Logit-Normal distribution, the non-parametric version draws them
from the “observed” election. Here, the observed election is the election being tested,
which may be contaminated.
Again, the test must be calibrated for the null election, the 2012 US Presidential
election. I estimate the critical value with the following code.
usd = read.csv("usa2008pres.csv")
usC = usd$MCCAIN




for(b in 1:B) {






quantile(TS,c(0.025,0.975)) ## The estimated CVs
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Figure 2.20: Estimated power curve for parametric empirical Benford test. Note that the
rejection rate grows slowly with increasing levels of contamination, ξ. The highest rejection
rate is just 0.17.
Figure 2.21 is the estimated distribution of the test statistic in this case. Note that a
95% confidence interval is from 4.44 to 22.23, on one million iterations. These limits
are close to those estimated in the parametric case. Again, the main difference between
the parametric and the non-parametric case is the simulation line, here Line 8. In the
parametric case, the election proportions were drawn from a Logit-Normal distribution;
in this case, from the observed US vote proportions.
As in the parametric case, the contamination is of the spike type. Full contamina-
tion has all leading digits a “1.” As above, various levels of contamination are achieved
by mixing the fully-contaminated and the null distributions.
Figure 2.22 is the estimated power curve for the non-parametric version of the
empirical Benford test. As in the parametric case, the power curve is rather flat and
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Figure 2.21: The distribution of the test statistic in the non-parametric case, based on one
million iterations.
disappointing. At full contamination, the rejection rate is only 0.189, meaning that this
procedure is only able to detect a fully-contaminated election 19% of the time.
As in the parametric case, other contamination schemes did not fare as well. Both
uniform contamination and shift contamination had power curves below this.
Again, we are faced with a disappointing conclusion. From the above analysis, I
cannot fully recommend any of these tests. While the Type I Error rates are close to
nominal, owing to the critical values being set to ensure that happened, the tests’ powers
are rather feeble.
This raises the problem of why an election fails the test, were it to fail. Would
it fail because it was unfair, or would it fail because of the natural Type I Error rate?
When power is this low, it is difficult to distinguish a false positive from a true positive.
55
Figure 2.22: Estimated power curve for non-parametric empirical Benford test. Note that
the estimated rejection rate remains low throughout. The maximum power is reached at full
contamination, with a rate of just 0.19.
2.6. Conclusion
Frequently, governments release vote counts at the division level. The counts have a dis-
tribution. Following the observation that the first several pages in a book of logarithm
tables were more used that later pages, both Newcomb (1881) and Benford (1938) showed
that the leading digit of certain types of data had a specific distribution—eponymously
called the Benford distribution. Its use in electoral forensics, however, makes the as-
sumption that the division sizes are exact powers of 10, which is not the case (Mebane
2010). To fix this, I introduced and explored what I termed the generalized Benford
distribution.
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While the distribution may work well for testing the leading digits of counts from
electoral divisions of equal size, it is not directly applicable for electoral divisions of
different sizes. The rest of the chapter explored several tests that could be used to handle
such cases, as well as tests to determine if this distribution is applicable to elections in
general.
The two generalized Benford tests I examined estimated the final digit distribu-
tion either using simulation or using an averaging method. The former is the Likelihood
Simulation test; the latter, the two Multinomial Averaging methods. In addition to
the generalized Benford tests, I formulated two empirical Benford tests. The first is a
parametric method that assumes the vote proportion follows a Logit-Normal distribu-
tion. The second is a non-parametric method that estimates the p-value and confidence
intervals using a bootstrap method.
In the cases of the generalized Benford test, the Likelihood Simulation method
produced inflated Type I Error rates—double expected. The two Multinomial Averaging
methods produced results quite similar to those of the Likelihood Simulation method.
In all three cases, the power curve showed a very high sensitivity to deviations from the
expected digit distribution. As we are not truly sure about the correct distribution of
count digits, this sensitivity may have been the cause of the inflated Type I Error rate.
The two empirical Benford tests showed a different problem. While the empirical
Type I Error rates were approximately nominal, their power curves were relatively flat
with estimated maximum power of 0.17 (parametric test) and 0.19 (non-parametric test).
Both are rather low.
Because of these results, I am able to recommend the use of the generalized Benford
test as long as it is just one of several tests used. The three tests were very sensitive to
departures from the assumed distribution, thus these tests may be treated as “gatekeeper”
tests—if the election passes, there is no real evidence of this type of unfairness (vote count
fabrication). If the election fails, further tests are needed.
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While these results are rather disappointing, they are not entirely surprising. Re-
call from Section 2.3.1 that the Benford distribution is equivalent to making the assump-
tion the vote proportions are Uniformly distributed. As this assumption is not met in
reality, one would not expect the Benford test in any of its guises to be appropriate.
In the next section, we move on from digit tests to regression tests. In this chapter,
we only had vote counts to analyze. In the next chapter, we include invalidation rates.
Under the free and fair hypothesis, these two variables should be independent. Thus,




The R code for the Westfall and Wolfinger (1997) min-p test.
minp.test = function(obs,exp, table=TRUE) {







# Get pj = min.p
pj=1.00
for(d in 1:9) {
pp=tbl[obs[d]+1,d]




for(d in 1:9) {
st = sort( as.numeric( tbl[,d]) )
wo = which( st<=pj )
if( length(wo)>0 ) {






# Calculate the adjusted p-value
padj = 1 - prod(1-pit)
names(obs)=1:9
names(exp)=1:9














The R code for the minp.table function.




pvals = matrix(NA, nrow=tmax+1,ncol=9 )
dimnames(pvals) = list(freq=0:tmax,digit=1:9)
mi = tmax * exp
for(d in 1:9) {
for(t in 0:tmax) {
r = 2*mi[d] - t
ptop = pbinom(t, size=tmax,prob=exp[d] ) +
1-pbinom(r, size=tmax,prob=exp[d] )
if(is.integer(r)) ptop=ptop+dbinom(r,size=tmax,prob=exp[d])
pbot = pbinom(r, size=tmax,prob=exp[d] ) +









The R code for creating B simulated elections:
## Import the election
us2008 = read.csv("usa2008pres.csv")
# Extract the needed data
divSize = us2008$OBAMA + us2008$MCCAIN + us2008$OTHER
divProp = us2008$MCCAIN/divSize
# Initialize the variables
B = 10000
elections = matrix(NA, nrow=B, ncol=length(divProp))
# Begin: loop








Côte d′Ivoire, 2010. After almost a decade of civil war and five years of post-
poned elections, Ivoirians went to the polls in 2010 to elect their fifth president. Three
major candidates presented themselves for the first round: Henri Bédié, the republic’s
second president who ascended to the position after the death of long-time leader Félix
Houphouët-Boigny; Alassane Ouattara, a former prime minister who left his position in
1993 at the urging of Bédié; and President Laurent Gbagbo, whose presidency spanned
the civil war that embroiled the country for eight years.
October 31 was the date for the first round. Should no candidate obtain 50%+1 of
the votes cast, there would be a runoff election between the two leading vote recipients.
As expected, militias and the remnants of the northern rebellion made voting in the
west and the north dangerous. Candidates accused each other of vote fraud. Multiple
sources reported different vote totals for these three candidates. The official source, the
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), gave Bédié third place with only 25.2% of the
vote (Yàn 2010).
The November 28 second round election featured President Gbagbo and Ouattara.
Ouattara accused Gbagbo of causing the civil war, while Gbagbo claimed Ouattara had
planned two coup attempts. Supporters of each were divided along tribal lines.
The CEI began to announce tallies as they became available. However, the coun-
try’s division found its way even to the allegedly independent CEI, with one member
snatching official vote counts from another during a press conference. No results were
announced that night.
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Each side accused the other of vote fraud. Security forces sought to stifle the
violence, but merely added to it. By the time the CEI announced that Ouattara won
the election with 54% of the vote, the two sides were in open conflict. To make matters
worse, the Constitutional Council declared the CEI had no legitimacy and announced
President Gbagbo had won the election (BBC News 2011).
Although the international community recognized Ouattara as the legitimate pres-
ident, it took foreign intervention and six months of civil war before Gbagbo left the pres-
idency, allowing Ouattara to take the helm of the deeply divided country (BBC News
2011).
And yet, the question remains. Two official Ivoirian agencies reported different
election outcomes. The Constitutional Council claimed the CEI returns were fraudulent.
To rectify this, the Constitutional Council invalidated all votes in the seven northern
provinces—Ouattara’s stronghold (AFP 2010).
Did the Constitutional Court have evidence of electoral fraud? If so, what was it?
3.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I explored several tests of the reported vote count. Since that was
the only information available, those tests compared the observed count to a hypothesized
distribution. In that chapter, we discovered that the tests were of questionable utility.
Either the hypothesized distribution did not appear to match reality or the test was of
low power.
In this chapter, I examine tests comparing the invalidation rate with the candi-
date support rate. Under the free and fair hypothesis, these two variables should be
independent. If not, then the invalidation rate depends on for whom the ballot was cast.
A violation of the free and fair hypothesis may be due to an unfairness in the electoral
system or to electoral fraud.
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An example of the former: the elderly support Candidate X over Candidate Y,
but they tend to fill out their ballots improperly. This increases the invalidation rate for
Candidate X. The tests of this chapter will detect that unfairness if the elderly tend to
live in certain electoral divisions over others.
An example of the latter: Supporters of Candidate X stuff the ballot box in
certain electoral divisions. Those ballots have two things in common: They are filled
out correctly, and they are filled out for Candidate X. This can be detected using the
methods of this chapter as the two variables, invalidation rate and candidate support
rate, are no longer independent.
These tests are all variations of regression tests. As such, I begin with a review of
regression schemes, examining ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and its assump-
tions, which are not met in this type of environment. Weighted least squares (WLS)
takes care of some of the problems with OLS, but WLS assumes the covariance matrix
is known. Here, that is not the case, and I propose feasible generalized least squares
regression (FGLS) as the solution to estimating the effects of the candidate support on
the invalidation rate.
Secondly, I note that there may be two types of electoral divisions: fair and unfair.
Current methods in electoral forensics treat all divisions as though they were from the
same population. I hypothesize a threshold τ that separates the fair from the unfair. The
key is to estimate it correctly. To solve this problem, I introduce three options: threshold
search, the Expectation-Maximization algorithm (as the Healy-Westmacott algorithm),
and an empirical version of Bayesian regression.
3.2. Least Squares Regression
The previous chapter dealt with the case in which the government only reports the
vote counts for the candidates at the electoral division level. There, I used digit tests
to examine the likelihood that the data were generated from a natural voting process.
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In addition to the candidate vote counts, governments may also report the number of
invalidated ballots at the electoral division level. In such cases, we can perform additional
tests.
In the presence of invalidation, the free and fair hypothesis is that each person’s
vote has the same probability of being invalidated as any other person’s ballot—this
invalidation must be independent of the candidate chosen on the ballot.
3.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares. A typical test for independence of two ratio-level
variables is a t-test on the estimated slope parameter arising from ordinary least squares
regression (OLS). The two most important strengths of using OLS to estimate the effect
are that OLS is robust to violations of its assumptions and that OLS is easily performed.
However, violations of the homoskedasticity assumption produce biased standard
error estimates, which means the p-values are biased. Solutions to this issue include
transforming the variables (Younger 1979) and adjusting the estimated standard errors
(White 1980). In lieu of adjusting the data or the standard error estimates, one can use
knowledge about the process to improve the model.
As the dependent variable is a proportion, the expected variance of the distribution
of the observations under the null hypothesis is π(1 − π)/Ni, where Ni is the number
of votes cast in electoral division i. Note that the variances are equal under the null
hypothesis if and only if the division sizes are equal. As division sizes tend to be unequal,
the model may be heteroskedastic. A usual solution to this issue is to use weighted least
squares to estimate the slopes.
In matrix form, the linear model is Y = Xβ + ε, where Y is the column vec-
tor of invalidation rates, X is the design matrix consisting of a column of 1’s and a
column of candidate support rates, β is the vector of effect sizes, and ε is the vector
of residuals. Under ordinary least squares, we assume ε ∼ N (0, σ2In), which implies
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of p-values for using OLS under the null hypothesis. The observed
rejection rate (height) at the α = 0.05 level is 0.07837 instead of 0.05. Note that this observed
rejection rate is based on 100,000 trials.













which produces the expected hypothesis tests and confidence intervals.
3.2.2 Weighted Least Squares. While Equation 3.1 produces unbiased estimates
of β in the absence of misspecification, those estimates are inefficient in the presence of
heteroskedasticity (Kennedy 2003). This results in improper rejection rates under the
null hypothesis. Figure 3.1 is a histogram of the p-values under the null hypothesis, with
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the height of the first bar representing the rejection rate at α = 0.05. For the p-value to
have its usual meaning, its distribution must be Uniform(0,1). For this histogram, that
is not the case. In fact, the usual OLS test rejects at a 0.07837 rate.
In terms of the current paradigm, the model remains Y = Xβ + ε, with ε ∼
Nn(0,Σ), where Σ is an arbitrary, yet known, positive definite covariance matrix. It is













In this research, the null hypothesis is that the errors are independent; that is, Σ is





. Thus, the distribution of β̂ is
β̂WLS ∼ N
(
β, σ2π(1− π) (X′diag {Ni}X)−1
)
,
where σ2 is a measure of overdispersion.
Since we do not know the value of π, it must be estimated from the data. Unfor-
tunately, the weighted least squares method will produce biased standard error estimates
in this case (Fromby et al. 1984). Note that this bias is most severe when the variance is
a function of an predictor variable. To produce unbiased estimates of the standard errors
when the covariance matrix is unknown, one can use feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS).
3.2.3 Feasible Generalized Least Squares. Because the weighted least squares
method requires the covariance matrix be known, it is unsuitable for examining elections
in this context. The covariance matrix depends on the estimated parameter π. To fix
this issue, Fromby et al. (1984) created the feasible generalized least squares method.
This method is frequently defined in the literature (see, e.g., Chaturvedi 1995;
Fromby et al. 1984; Klaassen and Magnus 2001; Magee 1998). The methods appear to
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agree on one thing: FGLS estimates the covariance matrix using ordinary least squares
regression, then uses that matrix in weighted least squares regression.
Following the work of Fromby et al. (1984), the FGLS routine I use consists of
iterating two steps until convergence: fit the data with the current estimated covariance
matrix, estimate the covariance matrix using the residuals (Gullickson 2007).
Under the null hypothesis, the electoral problem provides structure to the co-
variance matrix. The invalidation rates are independent across the electoral divisions.
The population invalidation rate is constant across the electoral divisions. Under these























Both σ2 and π need to be estimated from the data. In this context, σ2 is an overdispersion
parameter, π is the population invalidation rate, and N = diag {N1, N2, . . . , Nn}, with
Ni the vote total in electoral division i.
In the OLS step, β̂ = (X′X)−1X′Y, and β̂0 serves as the current estimate of π.























In subsequent steps, the estimate uses the previous estimate of the covariance




Step 2: π(k) = β̂
(k)
0





Step 4: Σ(k) = σ̂2(k)π(k)(1− π(k))N
Iteration continues until the change in σ̂2(k) is sufficiently small.
Using this procedure, Fromby et al. (1984) showed the parameter estimates have










Y, and Σ̂ = σ̂2π̂(1− π̂)N
Here, the hats represent the values of the estimates at the final iteration.
Compare Figure 3.2 to Figure 3.1, which both consist of 100,000 p-values calcu-
lated from data generated under the null hypothesis and the two fitting schemes. Under
ordinary least squares (Figure 3.1), the actual rejection rate was more than 50% higher
than it should have been. Under feasible generalized least squares, the observed rejection
rate is within the 95% confidence interval of α = 0.05. This indicates FGLS is a better
routine than OLS, at least under this metric.
3.2.4 An Illustration. To illustrate feasible generalized least squares regression
with election data, let us return to the Afghan presidential election of 2009. Table 3.1
provides both the OLS and the FGLS estimates of the model predicting the invalidation
rate using the proportion of the vote for Hamid Karzai.
The OLS symmetric 95% confidence interval for the candidate effect β1 is from
−0.0548 to 0.0523, with a p-value for the non-directional hypothesis of 0.9611. The
FGLS symmetric 95% confidence interval is from −0.0004 to 0.0145, with a p-value for
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of p-values for using FGLS under the null hypothesis. Note that the
observed rejection rate (orange bar) is 0.04994, which is well within a 95% confidence interval
of α = 0.05 (trials=100,000). Thus, FGLS appears to fix problems with OLS.
the non-directional hypothesis of 0.0628. While we are still unable to reject the free
and fair hypothesis at the usual level, it is much closer. This difference is due to the
covariance matrix Σ̂ estimated in Step 4.
Three final notes before continuing. First, FGLS is an iterative routine, while
OLS and WLS are not. This makes FGLS slower than either of the other two methods.
In fact, FGLS is OLS plus iterations of WLS. Second, because the variance is not a
function of an independent variable, there is little difference in the parameter estimates
or their standard errors produced by WLS and by FGLS. Third, because of these two
observations, I suggest using weighted least squares, unless the calculated p-values are
close to α.
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Parameter OLS WLS FGLS
π0 0.0500 0.0542 0.0554
β1 -0.0013 -0.0060 -0.0061
σ2 0.0266 1308.32 1160.75
Table 3.1: Comparison of parameter estimates for the 2009 Afghan presidential election. Note
that the parameter estimates using WLS and FGLS are quite similar.
3.3. Changepoint Regression
Each of the previous regression methods assumed the data came from a single population.
That is, they assumed the data-generating process was the same across all electoral
divisions.
However, in the presence of violations of the free-and-fair hypothesis, this may
not be the case. In those countries that do not count the votes centrally, electoral fraud
may take place differentially across the electoral divisions; some divisions experience it,
others not.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the problem that arises because of the presence of two pop-
ulations. The points represent each electoral division. There are two types: those from
electoral divisions experiencing electoral fraud (orange) and those not (green). If all elec-
toral divisions are treated as originating from a single population (left panel), the effect
is not statistically significant (p = 0.121). If the two populations are treated separately,
the regression on the orange sample does detect a statistically significant relationship
(p = 0.029).
The regression method used to regress on two separate populations goes by many
names: hockey-stick, piecewise, broken-stick, etc. (Yanagimoto and Yamamoto 1979).
This regression is a type of non-linear regression.
For this problem, the statistical model is
Y = α0 1{X < τ} + β0 1{X ≥ τ} + β1X1{X ≥ τ} + ε (3.2)
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Figure 3.3: Graphics demonstrating the need to be able to test for two populations. In the
left panel, the single regression line on the left does not have a statistically significant slope.
The right panel, the slope of the post-threshold regression line is statistically significant at the
α = 0.05 level.
Here, τ is the cutpoint (threshold) separating the two populations. This model explicitly
assumes that all electoral divisions with candidate support less than τ are fair. With
this model, the null hypothesis is H0 : β1 = 0 and α0 = β0. If τ is known in advance,
this model can be fit with any regression method from the previous section. However, if
τ must be estimated from the data, the solution is not as easy.
In the remainder of this section, I explore three methods for detecting the cutpoint
of the two populations: threshold grid search, Healy-Westmacott regression, and Bayesian
regression.
3.3.1 Threshold Search. The usual situation is that the threshold τ is not known
a priori ; it must be estimated from the data. One method is to estimate τ from the data
by selecting multiple thresholds, measuring a relevant quantity at each, and selecting the
threshold based on those measurements. As regression often seeks to minimize the sum
of the square residuals, this is an appropriate relevant quantity.
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Figure 3.4: Plots of the sum of square residuals against the threshold, τ . The left panel is the
plot for the results of the 2010 Ivoirian runoff presidential election. The right panel is the plot
for independent data under similar constraints. Note that there appears to be little difference
between the two plots.
Figure 3.4 (left panel) provides a scatter plot of the sum of square errors against
the threshold τ for the 2010 Ivoirian presidential runoff election. Note that each possible
threshold produces approximately the same error level. In other words, there is no strong
evidence for one threshold over another.
This is echoed in the independent case (Figure 3.4, right panel). The elections
for this case were generated to have the two variables, invalidation rate and candidate
support rate, independent of each other, but to match the Ivoirian election in all other
ways. Note that it, too, is relatively flat. These two graphics strongly suggest that there
is no boundary between fair divisions and unfair divisions. All electoral divisions are
equally fair (or unfair).
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Figure 3.5: Plots of the sum of square residuals against the threshold, τ . The left panel is the
plot for the results of the 2010 Sri Lankan presidential election. The right panel is the plot for
independent data under similar constraints. Note the difference in form between the two plots.
Contrast this with Figure 3.5 (left panel), which provides a plot of the sum of
square errors against threshold value for the 2010 Sri Lankan presidential runoff election.
Note that those thresholds left of τ = 0.37 do not affect the mean square error of the
model much; however, those thresholds to the right of τ do. This suggests that those
electoral divisions which had a vote of less than 0.37 for President Mahinda Rajapaksa
had a relatively constant invalidation rate, while those with a higher vote proportion for
the president did not. This is evidence against the free and fair hypothesis.
Figure 3.5 (right panel) provides a plot of the sum of square errors against thresh-
old value for the independent case. These data were created from two independent uni-
form distributions. The x-values ranged between the maximum and the minimum vote
share for Rajapaksa. The y-values ranged between the maximum and minimum invali-
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Figure 3.6: Plot of the invalidation rate against vote support for President Mahinda Rajapaksa
for the 2010 Sri Lankan presidential election. The threshold value of τ = 0.37 arose solely from
Figure 3.5.
dation rates. Note that all thresholds produce segmented regressions of approximately
equal quality.
I manually selected the threshold value of τ = 0.37 as the greatest threshold
before the sum of square errors began to consistently increase. Using that threshold
value, the regression line on the points to the right has slope -0.023 (p < 0.0001). Figure
3.6 shows that the invalidation rate for those divisions with Rajapaksa support greater
than τ = 0.37 is not independent of Rajapaksa support. This is also very strong evidence
against the free and fair hypothesis.
An Optimal Threshold: In the previous example, I manually selected the threshold
by examining the graphic. A better method for estimating the threshold value τ is to
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perform a modified CUSUM test. Page (1955) introduced the CUSUM test to detect a
changepoint in a stationary time series. The CUSUM procedure consists of calculating the
cumulative sum of the deviations from the mean of the series. The optimal changepoint
is the point corresponding to the largest absolute cumulative sum. That is, let {yi} be
a series of measurements taken at equal intervals. Calculate Cj =
∑j
i=1 ( yi − ȳ ) at each
point in the series j. The optimal changepoint is
τ ∗ = argmax
j
|Cj|
However, this test is only able to detect a change in the mean of the series (Page
1955). To modify it to detect a change in the slope of the series, one merely has to
perform the test on the first differences of the measurements. That is, let {yi} be a
series of measurements taken at equal intervals. Define the first differences as di =






at each point in the series j. The Page-optimal
changepoint is
τ ∗p = argmax
j
|Dj|
Performing this procedure on the Ivoirian 2010 election provides an optimal thresh-
old of τ ∗p = 0.067. For the Sri Lankan 2010 election, the optimal threshold is τ
∗
p = 0.470.
Performing the segmented regression test with this threshold produces similar results—
the regression line on the electoral divisions to the right of the threshold has slope
β1 = −0.016 (t = −3.19; p = 0.0017). Again, this is strong evidence against the free
and fair hypothesis.
Note that this analysis assumes the usual regression tests are appropriate under
this selection procedure. Demonstrably, they are not. Figure 3.7 shows the distribution
of the p-values of the usual WLS test of independence when the cutpoint is selected
in this manner. The orange-colored bar represents the frequency of tests for which the
calculated p-value was less than 0.05. If this is an appropriate test, we would expect
the height of this bar to be approximately 5%. Here, the height is about 10%; that is,
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Figure 3.7: Histogram of the calculated p-values based on the test described in the text. Note
that the first bar, representing tests for which the p-value was less than 0.05, is about twice the
expected height. The number of iterations performed was 1,000,000.
using this procedure, one commits a Type I Error twice as often as expected. This is not
a good feature of a statistical test. The distribution of p-values, for a continuous test
statistic, should be standard Uniform (Westfall and Wolfinger 1997).
To adjust for this issue, three options present themselves. First, one may be able
to derive the distribution of the test statistic from first principles. Second, one can use an
estimated distribution for the distribution of the test statistic. Third, one is able to use
Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the distribution of the test statistic—the parametric
bootstrap. The first option may not be possible. The second option is of questionable
utility. The third option can be done, but the calculations take time. However, if the
simulations are run using the parameters from the election, namely the division sizes,
the results are satisfactory and defensible.
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Figure 3.8: Plot of the invalidation rate against vote support for President Laurent Gbagbo
for the 2010 Ivoirian presidential runoff election. The optimal threshold value of τ∗p = 0.067
arose from Page’s CUSUM test (1955).
Using ten thousand simulations, the estimated critical values (α = 0.05) for the Sri
Lankan 2010 presidential election using simulation are −2.68 and 2.80. As the calculated
test statistic for this election is −3.19—inside the rejection region. Furthermore, the
estimated p-value is 0.0160, compared to the reported 0.0017. Thus, again, we have
evidence that the Sri Lankan presidential election of 2010 lacks fairness, albeit not as
strong as suggested by the usual test.
Returning to Côte d′Ivoire: Figure 3.8 provides the invalidation plot for the 2010
Ivoirian presidential runoff election. The Page-optimal threshold was estimated using
the methods outlined above. The slope of the right segment is −0.015, with a t-value of
−2.592. This is significantly different from zero at the usual α = 0.05 level (p = 0.0112).
From this, one would likely conclude that there is significant evidence of electoral fraud.
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However, as I did with the Sri Lankan election above, I use simulation to estimate
a corrected rejection region. Again, using 10,000 simulations, the estimated critical values
are −2.94 and 3.04. This results in a simulated p-value of 0.098. Note that one cannot
conclude, at the usual α level, that there is significant evidence of electoral fraud. This
example shows the importance of not relying on the “usual” tests when the threshold is
selected to optimize a quantity related to the model’s goodness of fit.
3.3.2 Healy-Westmacott Regression. In this section, I introduce, explore, and
use an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm method developed by Healy and West-
macott (1956).
The EM algorithm is a general method designed by Dempster et al. (1977) to
unify several related methods for estimating parameters in the presence of missing data.
While Dempster et al. (1977) unified and expanded the methods, they did not create
them. Two-score years earlier, Healy and Westmacott (1956) formulated a method for
estimating parameters with missing data. While they worked in the realm of analysis
of variance, their general method works well for regression. Regarding the missing data,
Healy and Westmacott (1956, p 204) realized
the fictitious values [estimated data] are actually the expected values of the
missing units derived from the correct least-squares estimate
This method is an example of the EM algorithm when the likelihood is linear in the data
(McLachlan and Krishnan 2008).
Let us again define our data model as
yi = α0(xi < τ) + β0(xi ≥ τ) + β1xi(xi ≥ τ) + εi
The yi and xi are the invalidation rate and the candidate support in division i, respec-
tively, and τ is the threshold between the two regimes.
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Under this formulation, the Healy-Westmacott algorithm is
1. Fit the data with Y, X, and τ (k−1). One can use any appropriate regression method.
For reasons discussed in Section 3.2.3, this should be WLS or FGLS.
2. Calculate the value of τ (k) as
argmin
τ (k)∈(0,1)
{∥∥∥Y − α0 (X < τ (k))− β0 (X ≥ τ (k))− β1X (X ≥ τ (k))∥∥∥ } .
In this formulation, however, there is no “missing” data. The one parameter of interest,
τ , can be estimated using only Step 2:
τ ∗ = argmin
τ∈(0,1)
{∥∥∥Y − α0 (X < τ)− β0 (X ≥ τ)− β1X (X ≥ τ)∥∥∥ } .
This is its least squares estimate if ‖·‖ is the usual Euclidean norm.
The Healy-Westmacott algorithm, however, allows us greater flexibility: Perhaps
there are two types of electoral divisions, but their dividing line is not a threshold on
the candidate support rate. This algorithm allows us to separate all divisions into two
groups, one with a zero slope and another with a (possibly) non-zero slope.
If we define Z as the vector of class membership, the Healy-Westmacott algorithm
becomes




0 , and β
(k)
1 .




 1 yi − α0 > yi − β0 − β1xi0 Otherwise
Step 2 assigns the division to the current closest regression line.
Note that this is a typical EM algorithm where the first step is to calculate the
parameters based on the current data (Y, X, and Z(k−1)), and the second step is to
update the estimated data (Z(k)) based on those parameters (McLachlan and Krishnan
2008).
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Also note that this algorithm will produce two regression lines. Even under the null
hypothesis, it is likely that the oblique regression line will have a statistically significant
slope parameter. As such, we cannot rely only on that parameter. We must also take into
consideration whether the two-line model is an improvement over the null model (a single
horizontal line). There are asymptotic results when using the likelihood ratio statistic
(Neyman and Pearson 1933), however this research is not about elections in Asymptopia.
I strongly recommend using Monte Carlo to estimate the correct critical value(s).
As with the method of Section 3.3.1, the distribution of the regression test statis-
tics is not Student’s t. From preliminary exploration, it appears as though the actual
distribution of the test statistic is stochastically less than that of the Student’s t distri-
bution; that is, the test will tend to reject at a rate in excess of α.
To handle this issue, the same three options present themselves. Again, I sug-
gest estimating the p-value and confidence interval using simulation with experimental
parameters equal to the parameters of the election.
To illustrate the results of this section, let us return to 2010 Sri Lanka. Figure
3.9 provides the invalidation plot. The green dots represent “fair” divisions; orange,
“unfair.” Note that the dividing line is not a vertical threshold.
To determine if this result is an improvement over the null model (all divisions
green), I measure the ratio of the null model’s squared standard error to that of the model
graphed. The ratio is 1.67. To determine if this represents a significant improvement over
the null model, I simulate 10,000 elections from the null distribution, collecting the test
statistic for each. The upper 95th percentile is 1.57 and the estimated p-value is 0.0065.
Thus, the two-line model is significantly better than the null model. The substantive
conclusion is that we again have strong evidence against the free and fair hypothesis for
the Sri Lankan 2010 presidential election.
Contrast this with the Ivoirian presidential runoff election. Figure 3.10 provides
the usual invalidation plot with colors having the same meaning as above. The test
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Figure 3.9: Plot of the invalidation rate against vote support for President Rajapaksa for the
2010 Sri Lankan presidential election. The green divisions represent those following the null
hypothesis; the orange divisions, the alternative.
statistic (ratio of null residual variance to two-line residual variance) is 1.61. Estimating
the distribution for this test statistic using 10,000 simulated (null) elections gives a critical
value of 1.65, resulting in an estimated p-value of 0.080. Thus, we can conclude that this
two-line model is not a significant improvement over the null model; that is, this test
does not suggest evidence of electoral fraud in the election.
3.3.3 Empirical Bayes. The previous section did provide a generalization of the
requirement that unfair divisions are those with candidate support above a specified
threshold. However, it was ultimately unsatisfactory; it is rather difficult to believe that
people in electoral divisions with very low support for the candidate are able to muster
the ability to stuff the ballot boxes to a degree sufficient to affect the vote. Thus, while
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Figure 3.10: Plot of the invalidation rate against vote support for President Gbagbo for the
2010 Ivoirian runoff presidential election. The green divisions represent those following the null
hypothesis; the orange divisions, the alternative.
that section did offer an interesting option to discovering two populations, the results
have a tenuous connection to reality, at best. As such, let us return to estimating a
threshold value separating fair and unfair divisions.
Note that in addition to the previous frequentist methods, one can use Bayesian
methods. The advantage of Bayesian methods is that the entire distribution of all parame-
ters of interest can be specified, under the assumption that the selected prior distributions
are correct (Ntzoufras 2009).
Bayesian methods rely on Bayes’ Law, which relates the prior distribution, the
posterior distribution, and the likelihood of the data:
f(θ |x) = f(x |θ)f(θ)
f(x)
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Here, the posterior distribution of the parameters θ given the data is f(θ | x). The
prior distribution of the parameters is f(θ), the data distribution is f(x | θ), and the
probability of observing the data is f(x). Fortunately, while f(x) is usually unknown, it
is a constant with respect to θ (Gelman et al. 2003). This leads to the “unnormalized
posterior density”
f(θ |x) ∝ f(x |θ)f(θ)
The likelihood function arises from the data model. As before, the data model is
Y = α0(X < τ) + β0(X ≥ τ) + β1X(X ≥ τ) + ε
with ε ∼ Nn (0, σ2I).
The prior distribution is selected by the researcher on the basis of prior information
about the data-generating process. When the prior information is sparse, the prior
distribution should be weakly-informative or non-informative. Multiple priors should be
used to determine the sensitivity of the posterior distribution. Multivariate priors can be
used, however products of univariate prior distributions tend to work “better” (Gelman
et al. 2003; Jeffreys 1946).
Suggested Prior Distributions: In this model, there are five parameters for which
priors need to be selected: τ , α0, β0, β1, and σ
2. The following provides considerations
for selecting appropriate priors for each.
The threshold value τ ranges from 0 to 1, exclusive. In the name of “letting the
data speak,” I suggest selecting a low-information prior distribution, specifically
τ ∼ BETA(1, 1)
This is the Uniform distribution.
The constant term for the below-threshold points α0 also ranges from 0 to 1,
exclusive. The average invalidation rate makes a natural expected value for α0. I suggest
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According to this distribution, the expected value of α0 is E[α0 ] = ȳ.
Along the same vein of letting the data speak, I suggest low-information prior
distributions of
β0 ∼ N (0, 100)
β1 ∼ N (0, 100)
for these parameters.
Finally, the variance of ε is a latent variable whose distribution only needs to be
sufficiently non-informative and positive. For this reason, I suggest σ2 ∼ GAMMA(0.01, 0.01).
While these distributions are consistent with the problem, variations should also
be used to demonstrate the sensitivity of the results on the prior distribution selections.
Gibbs Sampling: With the selection of the prior distributions, the posterior distribu-
tions need to be estimated. While several techniques exist for this estimation, Gibbs
Sampling is popular (Geman and Geman 1984). It is based on the full conditional dis-
tributions of the parameters. The algorithm starts with an initial value for all of the
parameters, θ
(0)
i , for all i.
A random value is generated for each of the parameters based on the full con-
ditional distributions, p(θi | θ−i), the distribution of θi given the value of all other pa-
rameters. A second random value is generated for each of the parameters based on the
same full conditional distributions. These iterations continue until the researcher de-
termines the estimated parameters have converged in distribution to their true (target)
distribution (Albert 2009).
Unfortunately, such convergence is difficult to determine a priori. One rule of
thumb is to examine sequential plots of each parameter for evidence of complete mixing.
A second method is to compare parameter distributions at several places along the chain.
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Figure 3.11: A sequential plot (index plot) of parameter estimates for an example parameter
using the Gibbs Sampling algorithm. There are five chains. Note the evidence for mixing rather
quickly. Based on this plot, I would select 1000 as the burn-in period.
A third method is to start several chains in different places and look to see when they
are similar enough (Gelman et al. 2003; Ntzoufras 2009).
To illustrate this, I created a simulated election with a clear changepoint (τ =
0.600) and very little noise in the dependent variable:
x = runif(n, min=0.1,max=0.9)
r = rep(0.05, n)
r[x>tau] = -0.1*x[x>tau] + 0.11
y = r + rnorm(n, m=0,s=0.0001)
For this election, Figure 3.11 shows plots of five chains. Note that, beyond the first few
iterations, there does not appear to be much difference in the five chain distributions.
From this, one could conclude that the burn-in period is small, perhaps 1000.
In addition to determining a burn-in period and a collection period, the researcher
must ensure that there is no serial correlation in the parameter estimates. If such exists,
the parameter estimates should be ‘thinned’ to reduce the correlation (Ntzoufras 2009).
There is very strong autocorrelation in all five chains. This is troubling.
Once the target distribution is reached, one has estimates for all interesting pa-
rameters in model. These estimates include the mean, median, percentiles, etc.
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Parameter Mean StdDev. P0.025 P0.50 P0.975
α0 0.04961 0.00182 0.04614 0.04958 0.05325
β0 0.08224 0.03484 -0.00671 0.08837 0.13770
β1 -0.06520 0.04293 -0.13490 -0.07168 0.04282
τ 0.62809 0.09312 0.42710 0.64550 0.76770
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for the posterior distributions estimated for the simulated elec-
tion with the prior distributions provided in the text.
An Illustration: To illustrate the process, let us return to the generated election
described previously. The true parameter values are α0 = 0.05, β0 = 0.11, β1 = −0.10,
and τ = 0.60.
The data were fit using this Bayesian procedure. The burn-in was 1000, the chain
length was 10,000, and the number of chains was 5. Table 3.2 provides the parameter
estimates. Note that for this toy example, the Bayesian procedure recovered the param-
eter estimates, most importantly the threshold. For estimation, I used OpenBUGS with
the R2OpenBUGS library (Lunn et al. 2009; Sturtz et al. 2005).
The parameter of most interest in this setting is τ , which is the optimal threshold
between the fair and the unfair elections. Table 3.2 provides its summary statistics. The
95% Bayesian credible interval is from 0.43 to 0.77, with a mean of 0.63 and median of
0.65. The true value is 0.60, which is within the interval.
Plotting the effects is also instructive. Figure 3.12 plots each simulated electoral
division. The Bayesian-optimal threshold (posterior mean) is shown. Divisions are col-
ored based on their position with respect to that threshold. The two regression lines are
plotted.
Note that while the method estimates the threshold τ well, it may not estimate the
other parameters well. In particular, the slope β1 in the right hand region is particularly
incorrect.
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Figure 3.12: Scatterplot of the invalidation rate against the support for the simulated election
discussed in the text. Posterior means were used for parameters of the regression lines.
3.3.4 A Comparison of These Methods. In this part of the chapter, I covered
three methods for meaningfully partitioning the data. The first method is a simple grid
search maximizing the mean square error. The second method is the Healy-Westmacott
algorithm. The final method is Bayesian regression. For reasons discussed at the start
of Section 3.3.3, I withdrew the Healy-Westmacott estimator from consideration.
To determine which method is preferred, I will use the mean square error for the
reasons discussed in Section 1.3. I selected this metric as it combines both the bias of
the estimator and its variability.
MSE = bias2 + σ2
88
Noise Grid Bayesian Posterior
Level Search Mean Median
0.0010 0.000 259 0.001 653 0.000 402
0.0056 0.000 274 0.002 141 0.000 475
0.0316 0.000 507 0.001 909 0.000 449
0.1778 0.002 494 0.004 153 0.001 997
1.0000 0.041 021 0.044 498 0.069 044
Table 3.3: The mean square errors for the three threshold estimation methods discussed in
this section. The number of elections analyzed is 10,000 for the grid search, but only 1000 for
the two Bayesian methods.
The Simulated Elections: First, I needed to create several elections. Two vari-
ables were created for each election, an invalidation rate and a candidate support rate.
Elections with candidate support rate less than the threshold were created fair; the
two variables were independent. Elections with candidate support rate greater than the
threshold were created unfair; the two variables were dependent.
The basic code I used to generate the elections is given on page 86. I set the
threshold to τ = 0.600, α0 to 0.05, n to 100, β0 to 0.11, and β1 to −0.10. The noise
level is the standard deviation of the e variable. I generated 10,000 elections for five
different noise levels from 0.001 to 1.000. This range allowed me to determine which of
the methods best estimated the threshold value at different noise levels. When the noise
level is small, the relationship and threshold are very evident (e.g., Figure 3.12). When
it is large, there is neither an apparent relationship nor an apparent cutpoint.
The grid search algorithm ran relatively fast, analyzing 10,000 elections in approx-
imately an hour. The Bayesian method, however, was much slower. Each election took
approximately 1.9 seconds to analyze. For this reason, I only analyzed 1000 elections for
each of the five noise levels using the Bayesian technique.
Table 3.3 lists the mean square errors for each of the methods. Note that the
Bayesian methods consistently have the greatest mean square error of the group. In
terms of execution times, the Bayesian methods are significantly slower than the grid
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search. The only weakness with the grid search was that it did not always produce an
appropriate estimate. When the noise level was 1.000, the grid search failed to produce a
threshold estimate 167 times out of the 10, 000 elections; that is, in 167 elections, the grid
search estimated τ at the edge of the parameter space. The Bayesian methods always
produced an estimate.
3.4. Conclusion
The previous chapter examined several techniques for testing the free and fair hypothesis
for vote counts. In this chapter, I covered several techniques one can use when the
invalidation rates are also available. These techniques centered on regression tests.
Those regression tests blended two aspects. First, I noted that it is likely that
electoral divisions are of two populations: fair and unfair. Current regression use in
electoral forensics does not leverage this information, it assumes a single population. In
doing so, current tests are not as powerful as they could be.
Second, I noted that the use of ordinary least squares regression may be inappro-
priate for this type of data; different electoral divisions have different weights associated
with them (cf Section 7.1). These weights are due to the very number of ballots cast.
When the division has a low (absolute) turnout, it should lend less information to the
overall regression. When the division has a high turnout, it should lend much more
information to the regression. Ordinary least squares (OLS) ignores this additional in-
formation.
To solve the issue of division sizes, I suggested feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS). This method iteratively estimates the unknown covariance matrix. In doing so,
FGLS reduces the bias in the standard error estimates. Note that FGLS is an iterative
procedure; the first iteration is an OLS estimation, the following are weighted least
squares (WLS), with adjustments to the covariance matrix at each iteration.
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Feasible GLS produces estimates very similar to those of WLS when the het-
eroskedasticity is not a function of an independent variable. As the source of the het-
eroskedasticity in this research is the district vote count and not the vote for the candi-
date, the results of FGLS are very close to those of WLS. As WLS is faster than FGLS,
I recommended weighted least squares.
The solution to the two-populations issue came from assuming that there was a
threshold present in the election. I assumed that those divisions with a candidate support
rate less than that threshold were fair; those above, unfair.
While these assumptions may not be strictly met in reality, they will be good
approximations, especially when the probability of electoral fraud is dependent on the
candidate’s support in the division.
To estimate the threshold, I proposed three general methods. The first was a sim-
ple grid search. The second was a variation on the Expectation-Maximization algorithm
proposed by Healy and Westmacott. The final was a Bayesian model. Of these three,
the Healy-Westmacott algorithm proved itself poor in the context of electoral forensics.
I evaluated the remaining two methods with respect to three factors: mean square
error, execution time, and estimate production. By the first two metrics, the grid search
was superior to the Bayesian method. However, the grid search infrequently failed to
produce estimates.
Thus, we close this chapter with the following solution. When the government
publishes vote counts as well as invalidation rates, one should use the grid search al-
gorithm to estimate the threshold. Once the threshold is determined, weighted least
squares should be used to test the free and fair hypothesis: H0 : α0 = β0 and β1 = 0.
One must also remember to use simulation to estimate the critical values and p-values.
In the next chapter, I emphasize that voting is a spatial process. I then explore
how this affects the previous tests. I conclude the chapter by comparing the current
geographically weighted regression and my proposed spatial lag expansion model.
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3.5. Annex
The abbreviated R code for conducting feasible generalized least squares:





## Make the matrices
X = matrix( c(rep(1,n),x), ncol=2 )
Y = matrix(y, ncol=1)
M = diag(N)
Minv = diag(1/N)
## Get initial estimates (OLS Step)
bHat = solve(t(X)%*%X) %*% t(X)%*%Y
pHat = bHat[1]
resd = as.numeric(Y-X%*%bHat)
sHat = as.numeric(t(Y-X%*%bHat)%*%M%*%(Y-X%*%bHat) /( (n-2)*pHat*(1-pHat
) ))
vHat = diag(1/N)*pHat*(1-pHat)*sHat
## Get iterated estimates (FGLS Steps)




bHat = solve( t(X)%*%vHatInv%*%X) %*% t(X)%*%vHatInv %*% Y
if( sum((bHat.last-bHat)ˆ2)<tol.est ) break
pHat = bHat[1]
sHat = 1/(n-2) * t(Y-X%*%bHat) %*% M %*% (Y-X%*%bHat) / (pHat*(1-pHat))
vHat = as.numeric( sHat * pHat *(1-pHat) ) * Minv
if( abs(sHat.last-sHat)<tol.var ) break
}
## Estimate the estimate variance
sEst = solve(t(X)%*%solve(vHat)%*%X)
## Prepare the output
se = sqrt( sEst[2,2] )
p.val = pt( -bHat[2] / sEst[2,2]ˆ(0.5), df=n-2 )






Sri Lanka, 2010. In 2009, the civil war in Sri Lanka finally ended. The rebel Tamil
group in the north of the island state finally succumbed to the overwhelming drive of
the south to keep the island united under a Sinhalese ethnicity—with input from the
Tamil minority. This war, which saw the deaths of thousands and the introduction of
strategic suicide terrorism, ended with a combination of military acumen and natural
disasters—the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami ravaged the eastern part of the island, where
the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had stationed their navy. President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, as the titular head of the military, and General Sarath Fonseka, as
operational head of the military, led the final victory (Forsberg 2012).
The two were close friends through and until the end of the war, a fact that may
have led to the military ultimately being successful. However, the two public figures had
a falling out, and Fonseka entered the political fray in 2009, campaigning in the January
2010 presidential election against his former friend and ally.
Polls showed a very close race, which was to be expected, as both were held in high
esteem by many in Sri Lanka. Because of that, the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) predicted that the initial results may not show a clear winner and that it would
take upwards of a week to know the winner (BBC News 2010).
The run-up to voting day had the typical Sri Lankan violence: several died in
clashes between the supporters of Rajapaksa and others. Election day itself progressed
with the expected intimidation and violence at polling stations (CMEV 2010). However,
since no international observers were allowed to observe the election, the only evidence
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Figure 4.1: Map showing the level of candidate support for the 2010 Sri Lankan presidential
election. Support for incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa is shown in orange; challenger
General Sarath Fonseka, in blue. Darker colors indicate higher support. The capital is marked
with a blue dot.
of these events were the cold bodies and the conflicting claims by rival factions (BBC
News 2010).
The Sri Lankan Department of Elections began counting the ballots on schedule,
and the election winner was known within a few hours. The election race that was
supposed to be close ended with Fonseka officially receiving 40% of the vote, Rajapaksa,
58% (CMEV 2010).
A map of the support for the winning candidate is provided in Figure 4.1 (GADM
2014c; Sri Lanka 2010). Rajapaksa support is indicated in orange; Fonseka, in blue. Note
that Fonseka did well in the Tamil north and east; Rajapaksa in the Sinhalese south and
west. Rajapaksa carried the capital of Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte in the west (Colombo
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District, Western Province), marked with a blue dot. Fonseka carried his home Nuwara
Eliya District (Central Province).
The next day, Fonseka declared the results invalid due to voting irregularities. At
the four-star Cinnamon Lakeside hotel, Fonseka gathered his closest advisors to decide
his course of action. Later that morning, Rajapaksa ordered the hotel surrounded by the
military, effectively separating Fonseka from the outside world. Rajapaksa first accused
Fonseka of plotting a military coup, then of military offenses, and then of running for
president while in the military (BBC News 2010).
Through it all, Fonseka claimed widespread electoral fraud. The final report on the
election from the independent Center for Monitoring Election Violence agrees (CMEV
2010). The response from the US Embassy in Sri Lanka is silent on the issue (US State
Department 2010):
The United States congratulates Sri Lanka for the first nationwide election in
decades and President Rajapaksa on his victory. We look forward to contin-
uing the partnership between our two countries and working with the Gov-
ernment and the people to support a peaceful and prosperous Sri Lanka.
Today, Mahinda Rajapaksa is the President of Sri Lanka. General Fonseka was found
guilty of treason and sentenced to 20 years. Rajapaksa had Fonseka released on May 21,
2012 (BBC News 2012).
4.1. Introduction
The previous chapter covered several regression tests to detect violations of the free and
fair hypothesis, specifically the assumption that the invalidation rate is independent of
the candidate support rate. When these two variables are not independent, there is prima
facie evidence of electoral fraud.
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However, those tests can be also applied to testing for inequalities in the electoral
system, and not just fraud. Regressing the invalidation rate on the proportion of elderly
in the electoral division can test if the system is biased against the elderly. Regressing
the invalidation rate on the proportion of minorities can test if the system is biased
against minorities. Furthermore, it would be most appropriate to use several independent
variables at once. This will allow one to better test the independence hypothesis while
controlling for several variables (Chapter 6).
The previous tests tend to ignore the fact that voting is an inherently spatial event.
People near each other will tend to vote similarly (Mebane and Sekhon 2004). As such,
ignoring the geographical component omits relevant information. First, the residuals
may be spatially correlated. This would be a violation of most techniques discussed in
Chapter 3. Second, the effects may vary across the country. Not only would this be a
violation of the assumptions of all previous techniques, it would be interesting in itself.
Figure 4.2 illustrates that spatial correlation seems to be an issue with some
elections. The left map shows the invalidation rate in each Sri Lankan province. Darker
orange colors correspond to higher invalidation rates. The map suggests a hot spot for
invalidation in the north of the island. The right map shows the proportion of the vote
cast for incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The map also suggests a cold spot in
the north. Is the north different in both respects from the rest of Sri Lanka? That is an
interesting question.
This chapter concerns geography. First, I cover three current methods for modeling
geographic information. Those three methods are lagged variable regression, expansion
method, and geographically weighted regression. Second, I introduce a new method that
improves upon the first two and corrects some of the issues with the third. Before I tackle
these topics, I discuss detecting spatial correlation.
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Figure 4.2: Maps showing the invalidation rate(left) and the level of support for President
Rajapaksa in the 2011 Sri Lankan presidential election.
4.2. Detecting Spatial Correlation
Spatial correlation is the situation in which the value at a point is correlated with values
at other points. As with other types of correlation, spatial correlation can be positive or
negative. If the data have positive spatial correlation, then nearby values will be similar.
If the data have negative spatial correlation, then nearby values will be very dissimilar.
Figure 4.3 shows examples of negative (left), zero (center), and positive (right) spatial
correlation. Note that the spatial correlation is measured using rook continuity in all
three cases; that is, cells are neighbors only if they abut east-west or north-south, not if
they are diagonal.
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Figure 4.3: Three graphics demonstrating spatial correlation. The left panel shows strong neg-
ative spatial correlation; the center, none; the right, high positive. In all three cases, neighbors
are measured using rook contiguity; that is, neighbors are horizontal or vertical, not diagonal.
4.2.1 The Neighbor Matrix. That brings up the first topic: Neighbors and the
neighbor matrix (also known as the adjacency or the contiguity matrix) W. The purpose
of the W matrix is to specify the expected pattern of geographical correlation. The entries
in the neighbor matrix consist of values in [0, 1]. These values indicate which entities
are neighbors, and to what extent. Figure 4.4 provides a simple map with eight entities,
labeled A through H, with measures taken on each entity.
Contiguity type follows chess terms and meanings. According to the rook conti-
guity, the following ten pairs in Figure 4.4 are neighbors: (A,B), (A,E), (B,C), (B,F),
(C,D), (C,G), (D,H), (E,F), (F,G), and (G,H). Under bishop contiguity, the following
six pairs are neighbors: (A,F), (B,E), (B,G), (C,F), (C,H), and (D,G). As the queen can
move as a rook or as a bishop, the queen-contiguous neighbors are the union of the rook-
and bishop-contiguous: (A,B), (A,E), (B,C), (B,F), (C,D), (C,G), (D,H), (E,F), (F,G),
(G,H), (A,F), (B,E), (B,G), (C,F), (C,H), and (D,G).
While this example described neighbors as touching, there are extensions to the
rook-, bishop-, and queen-contiguities. Those described above are first-order contiguous.
Second-order contiguous includes neighbors of neighbors; third-order includes neighbors
of neighbors of neighbors; and so forth.
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Figure 4.4: A simple 2× 4 map to illustrate the concepts discussed in the text.
The map of Figure 4.4 shows that all entities are at most third-order queen-
contiguous, or fourth-order rook-contiguous. A shortest path from A to H is A - B - C -
H using queen contiguity, is A - B - C - D - H using rook contiguity, and is A - F - C - H
using bishop. Note that A and E are not neighbors of any order under bishop contiguity.
With this description, the neighbor matrix for first-order rook contiguity, assuming
you are your own neighbor (a.k.a. zeroeth-order neighbor), is
W =

1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1

(4.1)
Each i, j entry indicates whether cell i and cell j are contiguous according to the rook
definition.
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The cells need not indicate binary contiguity. Another type of neighbor matrix
includes an inverse distance as the cell entries. This distance can be Euclidean, geodetic,
or some other measure.
This discussion of contiguity is important as it determines to a large part whether
spatial correlation can be detected. For instance, the left panel of Figure 4.3 shows
highly negative spatial correlation using rook contiguity. However, were we to use bishop
contiguity, it would have strong positive spatial correlation. Furthermore, were we to use
queen contiguity, the spatial correlation would be close to zero.
4.2.2 Measures of Local Spatial Correlation. Now that we have defined neigh-
bors, detecting spatial correlation is relatively easy. There are several measures of local
spatial correlation. These measure differ from the global measures in that they calculate
correlation at each point, rather than the map as a whole.
There are several available measures. Moran’s Ii (Anselin 1995), Geary’s Ci (Geary
1954), Getis and Ord’s G∗i (Getis and Ord 1997), and Hatfield’s Hi (Hatfield 2011) all
measure different aspects of local spatial correlation. In lieu of using all measures, I use
the popular Moran’s Local Ii (Anselin 1995).
Definition 4.1 (Moran’s Local Ii Statistic). Let wij be the (i, j)
th entry in the neigh-
borhood matrix with wii = 0. Define zi = xi − x̄, where xi is the measurement at the ith
location and x̄ is the average of those measurements across the neighbors of i. Moran’s














A usual next step is to determine the distribution of the Ii statistic. To do so,
we need to make assumptions about the data values. The usual assumption here is the
“randomization assumption.” This assumption holds the measured values fixed (non-
stochastic), but randomize the entities to which they belong. Among other things, this
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makes the sample second moment, m2, non-stochastic. Thus, under the randomization
assumption, we have the following result (Anselin 1995).
Proposition 4.2 (The expected value of Moran’s Ii). Let Xi
iid∼ N (µ, σ2). Also, as
above, define zi = xi − x̄. If wi :=
∑
j wij, then E[Ii ] ≈ −
wi
n−1 .























































Back substitution gives our result: E[Ii ] = − 1n−1wi.
Under the same randomization assumption, and following Cliff and Ord (1981), Anselin

















j wij, b2 = m4/m
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As this variance is finite, the Central Limit Theorem tells us that the distribution
of Ii converges in law to the Normal distribution. With this, one can perform the usual
hypothesis tests and can calculate the usual confidence intervals.
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Figure 4.5: Maps of Moran’s local Ii for the Sri Lankan presidential election, 2010. The left
panel shows the p-value for Moran’s measure for each of the 25 districts. The right panel shows
the same for the vote proportion for Rajapaksa. Moran’s Ii is statistically significant in the
orange districts. In the grey districts, the darker shades correspond to lower p-values, to higher
significance levels.
Note that while the limiting distribution is Normal, the small sample distribution
is not. The “sample size” is not the number of geographic entities being investigated; it
is the number of neighbors each has. Thus, it is unlikely in real situations for the sample
size to be “large enough.” As such, Monte Carlo simulation should be used to estimate
the p-values and the confidence intervals. Monte Carlo simulation should also be used to
estimate the p-values and confidence intervals when the measurements are not Normally
distributed, such as when they are small proportions.
To illustrate these points, let us return to the maps of Figure 4.2, which show
the invalidation rate (left) and the vote proportion for Rajapaksa (right). Earlier, I
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Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 0.0395 0.0030 13.08 < 0.0001
Candidate support -0.0512 0.0057 -8.99 < 0.0001
Table 4.1: The regression table for regressing the invalidation rate on the candidate support
rate for the 2010 Sri Lankan presidential election. This global model is fit using ordinary least
squares regression.
remarked that there appeared to be evidence of hot and cold spots in the maps. The
north seemed a hot spot for the invalidation rate and a cold spot for Rajapaksa support.
Figure 4.5 shows maps of Moran’s local Ii statistic for each of the districts, using rook
contiguity. The left panel shows it for the invalidation rate; the right panel, the vote
share for Rajapaksa. Districts colored in orange show statistically significant positive
spatial correlation; districts in grey do not. Darker shades of grey indicate lower p-values
(higher levels of statistical significance).
Note that our observations in Section 4.1 were correct. There is evidence of sig-
nificant spatial correlation in this election in the north. Neither the invalidation rate
nor the candidate support are independently distributed across the island. This result,
in itself, is interesting. However, it is not a violation of the regression assumptions of
Chapter 3, per se.
Continuing the ideas of last chapter, let us regress the invalidation rate on the can-
didate support rate using ordinary least squares regression. Recall from Section 3.2 that
a statistically significant effect suggests unfairness in the election. The OLS-estimated
effects are provided in Table 4.1. Note that the candidate support effect is highly signif-
icant. This means that one should conclude that the invalidation rate and the candidate
support rate are not independent, which strongly suggests the presence of electoral fraud.
However, least squares regression (OLS and WLS) assumes the residuals are independent
and identically distributed. If there is spatial correlation in the residuals, this assumption
is violated.
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Figure 4.6: Map of Moran’s local Ii for the residuals of the global model. Moran’s Ii is statis-
tically significant in Jaffna District, colored orange. In the grey districts, the darker variations
correspond to lower p-values, to higher significance levels.
Figure 4.6 provides a map of p-values for the Moran’s Ii measures. In the grey
districts, the statistic is not significantly different from its expected value under the
hypothesis of no spatial correlation, with darker variations indicating higher levels of sig-
nificance (lower p-values). In Jaffna District (colored orange), the measure is significantly
different from its expectation. This suggests that the residuals are spatially correlated.
In fact, I9 = 5.764, with a p-value of less than 1 × 10−5. This indicates highly positive
spatial correlation in the Jaffna District even using the Bonferroni correction. Thus, we
can conclude that the residuals violate one of the least squares assumptions.
And so, we begin discussing modeling in space. The next section introduces a
first attempt at reducing—and modeling—the residual spatial correlation. It is called
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the spatial-lag model, and its logic follows that of its time-series regression (analysis)
analogue.
4.3. The Spatial-Lag Model
In time series analysis, one of the first attempts to model the temporal correlation was
the lagged dependent variable model (Wei 2006). This model included the temporally
lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. The coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable is termed the autocorrelation factor. Unfortunately, using ordinary
least squares to estimate this factor produces biased results (Keele and Kelly 2006).
The analogue in spatial analysis is the spatial-lag model (LeSage and Pace 2009).
It, too, includes a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. The lagged
dependent variable, however, is the neighborhood average. Thus, let W∗ be the row-
standardized neighborhood (adjacency) matrix; that is, define W∗ := W
WJ
, where the
multiplication is usual matrix multiplication, the division is Hadamard division (element-
wise division), and J is a matrix of all 1s. The spatial-lag model is
Y = ρW∗Y + Xβ + ε
Here, ρ is the neighbor effect, also known as the contagion effect.
To see that the OLS estimates of ρ can be biased, let us simplify this model
significantly. That is, let us define ȳ(i) as the arithmetic mean of the neighbors of entity
i. Let ρ be the level of spatial correlation between neighboring entities. The simplified
spatial-lag model, with ρ ∈ (−1, 1), is
yi = ρȳ(i) + εi (4.2)
With this simplification, this proof follows Anselin (1988), showing the bias.
Theorem 4.3 (Bias in the Spatial-Lag Model). Let us be given Model 4.2, with the errors
εi
iid∼ N (0, σ2). If the residuals are spatially correlated, the OLS estimate for ρ is biased.
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= 0; that is, the estimator is unbiased if the errors are
uncorrelated with the neighborhood averages. In reality, this strict exogeneity is never
fully met. Thus, if the entity measurements are spatially correlated, then so are the





= 0 only when the residuals are uncorrelated.
Thus, the parameter estimates from the spatial lag model are biased. Theorem
4.3, however, does not specify the level of bias. In time series analysis, (Keele and Kelly
2006, p186) showed that the lagged variable model was biased, but not much:
while the lagged dependent variable is inappropriate in some circumstances,
it remains the an appropriate model for the dynamic theories often tested by
applied analysts
In light of their analysis, it appears as though the spatial-lag model is an appropriate
model for this research. Its parameter estimates are only slightly biased, and it does
reduce the level of spatial correlation. Finally, it can be used with any of the regression
techniques covered in the previous chapter.
4.3.1 The SLM and Sri Lanka. To demonstrate the spatial-lag model, let us use it
on the Sri Lankan 2010 presidential election. Recall that the dependent variable is the
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.0257 0.0055 4.69 0.0001
Neighbor effect 0.4384 0.1535 2.86 0.0092
Candidate support -0.0354 0.0074 -4.76 0.0001
Table 4.2: Regression table for the spatial-lag model. Note that the neighbor effect is statisti-
cally significant, as is the candidate effect.
invalidation rate in each division and the independent variable is the candidate support
rate for incumbent Rajapaksa in the division.
The choice of neighborhood is uncomplicated as there are no bishop-contiguous
districts. Thus, using rook neighborhoods is equivalent to using queen neighborhoods.
Furthermore, LeSage and Pace (2012) concluded that the parameter estimates are not
sensitive to the choice of neighborhoods because the neighborhoods themselves are highly
correlated.
The parameter estimates from fitting the spatial-lag model are presented in Table
4.2. Note the statistical significance of the neighbor effect, ρ̂ = 0.4384. This finding
suggests that the neighborhood affects the invalidation rate. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that geography matters.
There is no evidence of spatial correlation in the residuals of this model. The
lowest p-value is 0.2370, which is for Jaffna District in the extreme north of the island.
Thus, this assumption of ordinary least squares regression is not violated. Whether
the assumption that the coefficients are constant is violated cannot be tested using this
model.
In terms of the free and fair hypothesis, this model provides evidence against
it. Here, the invalidation rate and the candidate support rate are not independent
(p = 0.000095). The effect, however, is rather small. For every 1% increase in the
vote proportion for Rajapaksa, the invalidation rate drops by 0.035%. For a 20% in-
crease in Rajapaksa support, the invalidation rate drops by 0.71%.
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Figure 4.7: Maps of the invalidation rate. The left map is the reported invalidation rate. The
right map is the predicted invalidation rate using the spatial-lag model.
Figure 4.7 provides maps of the reported invalidation rate (left) and the predicted
invalidation rate (right). Note that the model did well throughout the island, except for
the northern districts. One of the drawbacks to the spatial-lag model is that it is based
on neighbor averages. The Jaffna District has only one neighbor, Kilinochchi District.
All other districts have at least three neighbors.
4.3.2 Conclusion. The spatial lag model is effective at reducing the spatial correla-
tion, which is an improvement over the ordinary least squares regression of the previous
chapter. However, it has one important drawback. The spatial lag model makes the
assumption that the parameter effect is constant across the entire map, that the effect
surface is horizontal. This is a strong assumption that must be tested.
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Thus far, we have not come across a test that allows for spatially varying effects.
To allow for non-constant effects, Casetti (1972) replaced the constants with functions
of location. This I explore in the next section.
4.4. Casetti’s Spatial Expansion Method
In the previous section, I introduced the spatial-lag model, which is used for two pur-
poses. First, it can reduce the spatial correlation in the residuals. Second, it models the
neighborhood effect. It is not alone in the first of these two goals. Casetti (1972) cre-
ated the spatial expansion method to also reduce the spatial correlation of the residuals.
More importantly, the expansion method also models spatially-dependent effects—effects
varying across the map.
The spatial-lag model for a single predictor variable is
yi = ρȳ(i) + β0 + β1xi + εi
The model assumes that β1 effect is constant throughout the entire region; it is spatially
invariant. To model spatially varying effects, we replace the constant β1 with an arbitrary
function β1(i), where i is the entity and is a function of location (u, v); that is, β1(u, v)
describes the effect surface. From this, the expansion model is
yi = β0(u, v) + β1(u, v)xi + εi (4.3)
The complexity of the functions is limited only by the number of parameters needed to
estimate and the sample size—the degrees of freedom. This model is fit using any of
the regression techniques of Chapter 3. The issue reduces to determining the correct
functions. This is the method’s weakness (Fotheringham et al. 1998). Rarely is there a
priori knowledge about how the effects vary.
Using quadratic functions allows 4.3 to model effects that have a single extremum
on the map. Cubic functions can model effects with two extrema. Higher order functions
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can model effects with more extrema, at the expense of degrees of freedom and of fitting
the data rather than the process (the bias-variance tradeoff). As the purpose of this
research is to detect any spatial variation in the effects, a quadratic function may be
sufficient.
4.4.1 The SEM and Sri Lanka. To illustrate this method, let us return to the Sri














Here, u and v are arbitrary positional variables. I will use longitude and latitude for the
position of the division centroid. Using quadratic functions ensures that at most a single
internal extremum will be detected. In general, election theory should be used to select
the correct polynomial degree. However, such theory rarely exists.
Using ordinary least squares regression, the estimated effects, standard errors, t-
values, and p-values are provided in Table 4.3. Note that the nominal invalidation rate
is not constant across the island. From Figure 4.8, we see it has a minimum of 0.0057 in
Puttalam District in the far west and a maximum of 0.0698 in Hambantota District in
the south.
The candidate effect also spatially varies. It is strongest in the south (Puttalam,
−0.0936) and weakest in the middle west (Hambantota, 0.0029). It is also strong in
the north of the island, where the candidate effect is −0.0656 in Jaffna District. This
direction of variation is evident from the regression results (Table 4.3). The north-south
quadratic effect (v2) is statistically significant and has a higher magnitude than that of
the east-west effect (u and u2). It may also be interesting to note that the north-south
quadratic effect is the only statistically significant effect.
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Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Nominal Effect
Intercept -64.6802 107.8748 -0.60 0.5591
u 1.5834 2.5862 0.61 0.5509
v 0.0778 1.0478 0.07 0.9419
uv -0.0036 0.0123 -0.30 0.7724
u2 -0.0096 0.0155 -0.62 0.5488
v2 0.0135 0.0050 2.70 0.0182
Candidate Effect
Intercept 54.1632 198.5341 0.27 0.7893
u -1.3505 4.7840 -0.28 0.7822
v 0.3137 1.7839 0.18 0.8631
uv 0.0003 0.0211 0.01 0.9898
u2 0.0082 0.0289 0.28 0.7805
v2 -0.0211 0.0082 -2.57 0.0231
Table 4.3: Results of the expansion method regression as described in the text. Note that there
is significant positional effect on the invalidation rate (top block) and on the invalidation rate
through the candidate support rate (bottom block).
More importantly, this OLS model also shows no significant spatial correlation
in the residuals. Thus, there is no apparent violation of the assumption of the spatial
independence of the residuals. The expansion model allowed us to model the varying
effects of the candidate support and eliminated the troubling spatial correlation in the
residuals.
There is no a priori reason to select quadratic functions for the positional effects.
The fact that the north-south quadratic effect is the only statistically significant effect is
due solely to the distribution of the candidate effect on the ground.
4.4.2 Conclusion. The major drawback of this method is that the functional form
of the effect parameters is rather constrained. A high-degree polynomial will allow the
estimated effect function to better match the true variation. However, a high-degree
polynomial will also tend to reduce the degrees of freedom too much. Furthermore, in
both cases, there is the issue of model misspecification. The p-values are only appropriate
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Figure 4.8: Map of spatially-varying effects. The left map is of the base invalidation rate.
The right map is of the vote proportion for Rajapaksa across Sri Lanka. Darker tones of
orange correspond to high negative effects. White corresponds to no effect. Darker tones of
blue correspond to high positive effects. The district with the most extreme candidate effect was
Matara District in the south of Sri Lanka, with β1 = −0.0936.
if the model is correctly specified. To achieve the goal of flexibility in the effect function
without the cost in terms of degrees of freedom, Fotheringham created the geographically
weighted regression model.
4.5. Geographically Weighted Regression
A. Stewart Fotheringham, Martin E. Charlton, and Chris Brunsdon (1998) saw the ex-
pansion method as too rigid. They sought to allow the data a larger role in determining
the shape of the effect surface. This would allow for an arbitrary number of local extrema
in the effect surface.
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Name Formula
Unweighted wij = 1
Local unweighted wij = 1{dij ≤ h}






























Table 4.4: List of some kernels commonly used in geographically weighted regression. In all
formulas, dij is the distance between point i and point j, and h is the bandwidth for the kernel.
Geographically weighted regression estimates the effects at each point on the map
using weighted regression. These points may be points representing the entities, or those
points may be elements of an overlaying grid. The weighting scheme is selected by the
researcher, but should conform to the rules of kernel estimations. As with kernel density
estimation, the choice of kernel function is largely arbitrary, but the choice of bandwidth
is important (Fotheringham et al. 2003, Chapter 2). Table 4.4 provides several common
kernels, along with the corresponding functions. To calculate the weights matrix at
location i, you calculate the wij for your selected kernel and bandwidth, Wi = diag {wij}
for j ranging across all positions.
In terms of regression, geographically weighted regression looks familiar. The
model is
Y = (β′ ◦X) j + ε
Here, ε is an n × 1 vector of errors, j is an (p + 1) × 1 vector of 1s, ◦ is the Hadamard




β0(1) β0(2) · · · β0(n)





βp(1) βp(2) · · · βp(n)

(p+1)×n
Recall that n is the number of locations involved in the analysis.
Without additional structure, this equation cannot be solved; the number of pa-
rameters to estimate, n× (p+ 1), is greater than the number of data values to use. The
weights matrix adds this structure.
If we focus on a single location, i, the model equation becomes the familiar Y =





where Wi is a diagonal matrix consisting of the ith column of the neighbor matrix.
However, this result is not always correct. The correct result is the more general
β̂i = argmin
β
∥∥∥W1/2i (Y −Xβ)∥∥∥2 ,
which comes from the definition of least squares.
The Fotheringham et al. (2003) result is appropriate only when the weights are
the inverse of the variances associated with each measurement. In general, the Wi has
nothing to do with the variances. The theorem of Section 3.2.2 on page 66 shows the
condition under which the Fotheringham et al. (2003) result is valid.
The Fotheringham et al. (2003) result also requires the neighbor matrix to be
positive definite. This requirement is rarely an issue, unless you are investigating maps
with islands. Using any contiguity measure on the 50 US states results in a neighbor
matrix with rank less than 50; neither Hawai’i nor Alaska has a neighbor. To solve this
issue, cell values tend to be functions of distances rather than of contiguity.
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Note the most important feature of geographically weighted regression: the pa-
rameter estimates are allowed to vary at each experimental unit. This allows one to
explore how the effect varies across the map. Unfortunately, even when using the Fother-
ingham et al. (2003) result, there is no native way of conducting hypothesis tests or of
creating confidence intervals; the number of degrees of freedom are not known.
4.5.1 The GWR and Sri Lanka. To illustrate geographically weighted regression,
let us once again return to the 2010 presidential election in Sri Lanka. As the kernel
function is of little importance, I arbitrarily select the Gaussian kernel. In Kernel density
estimation, the bandwidth is much more important (Epanechnikov 1969). LeSage and
Pace (2012), however, imply that the final regression results are robust to even the
bandwidth.
For this example, I selected the fixed bandwidth that produced the lowest Akaike’s
Information Criterion (Akaike 1974). This resulted in a fixed bandwidth of 150km. This
means that each weighted regression includes approximately five neighbors.
According to the global model fit previously, the candidate effect is a constant
−0.0512 (Table 4.1). According to the spatial expansion model, the candidate effect
varies from −0.0940 to +0.0029. According to this geographically weighted regression
model, the candidate effect varies from −0.05699 (Jaffna District in the extreme north)
to −0.03904 (Hambantota District in the south).
Note that this result substantively differs from that of the spatial expansion model
(Section 4.4.1). That model concluded that the candidate effect was lowest in the center
of the country, with maxima along the north and south coasts. Here, the maximum is
still along the north coast. The minimum, however, is now estimated to be the southern
coast. Figure 4.2 may shed some light on the two models. The spatial expansion method
fit assumed a quadratic effect. The observed invalidation rate (Figure 4.2) is high in the
north and east, but it varies little across the rest of the districts. The quadratic function
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Figure 4.9: Map of spatially-varying effects for the geographically weighted regression model.
The left map is of the base invalidation rate. The right map is of the vote proportion for
Rajapaksa across Sri Lanka. Darker tones of orange correspond to high negative effects. White
corresponds to no effect. The candidate effects range from −0.0570 in Jaffna District to −0.0390
in Hambantota District.
forced the specific shape in the effect surface. Geographically weighted regression does
not force a specific shape; it allows the observations to create the shape.
Figure 4.9 shows the spatially varying effects. The left panel shows the variation in
the nominal invalidation rate; the right panel, the variation in the candidate effect. Both
maps suggest the process generating the invalidation rate in the north is dissimilar to that
in the south. Unfortunately, there is no native method for determining if that difference is
statistically significant or if the effect is statistically significant. The weighting invalidates
the usual rules for degrees of freedom. As such, bootstrapping remains the feasible
method for estimating confidence intervals and p-values (Fotheringham et al. 2003).
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4.5.2 Conclusion. In geographically weighted regression, weighted regression is per-
formed at each point i. This means the estimated effects parameter β̂ is a function of the
point i; that is, they are spatially varying. Furthermore, as points are weighted and used
in separate regressions, it means the number of degrees of freedom are not the sample
size n less the number of parameters fit.
The first result was the goal of Fotheringham et al. (1998). The effect surface
can now be more closely estimated. The second result is the most serious drawback
of geographically weighted regression. Until the number of degrees of freedom can be
determined, unadjusted t-tests should not be performed. Fotheringham et al. (2003,
§2.8) states this.
Regardless of the lack of tests and of the warning of Fotheringham et al. (2003),
researchers use geographically weighted regression to test hypotheses. Chen and Truong
(2012) attempt to find a relationship between obesity and township disadvantages in
Taiwan. They use geographically weighted regression, testing for parameter significance
and parameter variation using critical values of 1.96 and 3.92. Li et al. (2010) examine
the relationship between temperatures various environmental factors. The authors used
the typical t-tests to determine the statistical significance of their various variables.
Regardless of the technique’s (mis)use, geographically weighted regression does
compare favorably to the expansion method in one important manner (Paéz 2005). Ge-
ographically weighted regression is more flexible in estimating the effect surface than is
the expansion method. That this was the purpose behind geographically weighted regres-
sion is a positive. However, many researchers do warn about the method’s weaknesses
(Bivand and Yu 2013; Fotheringham et al. 2003; Paéz 2005).
In the next section, I create a method that retains the ability to test hypothesis,
while increasing the flexibility of the spatial expansion method. I term it the lagged
expansion method.
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4.6. The Spatially Lagged Expansion Method
Fotheringham et al. created geographically weighted regression to allow the data to
strongly suggest the effect surface. It was intended more for exploratory analysis than
for inferential analysis (Fotheringham et al. 1997, 2003). This idea is echoed by Bivand
and Yu (2013), in R’s spgwr package, which warns
NOTE: This package does not constitute approval of GWR
as a method of spatial analysis
As seen in the previous section, geographically weighted regression provides much
by way of pretty maps, but little by way of testing. Casetti’s expansion method provides
the testing methods, but is limited in its flexibility. The spatial lag model is flexible in
allowing local variation, but it does not allow for spatially varying effects. My solution is
to combine two of these three to create a method superior to the third. Adding the spatial
lag to the expansion method will allow flexibility approaching that of geographically
weighted regression, while still allowing for hypothesis testing, which is required in this
research.
And so, the spatially-lagged extension model is
yi = ρ(u, v)ȳ(i) + β0(u, v) + β1(u, v)xi + εi (4.5)
Here, ρ(u, v) is the neighbor (contagion) effect, ȳ(i) is the neighbor-average for entity i,
β0(u, v) and β1(u, v) are the nominal effect and the candidate effect, and εi is the error,
ε ∼ Nn (0,Σ).
Note that this model adds several features. First, it incorporates both spatially-
varying effects and a neighbor effect. Second, it allows for the neighbor effect to vary
across the map. Third, it no longer requires the errors to be independent and identically
distributed.
Fitting this model is easy in light of the regression methods of Chapter 3, specifi-
cally feasible generalized least squares regression of Section 3.2.3.
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Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Neighbor Effect
Intercept -1219.2381 665.0389 -1.83 0.1000
u 15.2309 8.2733 1.84 0.0988
v 161.9476 72.7705 2.23 0.0531
uv -2.0235 0.9062 -2.23 0.0524
Nominal Effect
Intercept -104.2957 93.6622 -1.11 0.2943
u 3.0057 2.2477 1.34 0.2140
v -4.6213 1.5891 -2.91 0.0174
u2 -0.0210 0.0135 -1.55 0.1545
v2 0.0232 0.0067 3.48 0.0070
uv 0.0531 0.0191 2.78 0.0214
Candidate Effect
Intercept 171.3883 195.4682 0.88 0.4034
u -4.6963 4.7776 -0.98 0.3513
v 4.9102 1.8895 2.60 0.0288
u2 0.0316 0.0292 1.08 0.3078
v2 -0.0308 0.0084 -3.68 0.0051
uv -0.0550 0.0225 -2.44 0.0371
Table 4.5: Regression table for the results of the spatial lagged expansion method. As with the
spatial expansion method, u represents the longitude; v, the latitude.
4.6.1 The SLEM and Sri Lanka. Returning again to the 2010 Presidential election
in Sri Lanka, I fit a model with all effects at the quadratic level. However, the statistical
significance of the parameter estimates indicated the model was overfit. Because of this,
I used a linear neighbor effect, a quadratic nominal effect, and a quadratic candidate
effect for the model. The results of the regression are provided in Table 4.5.
Note that there remain quadratic effects for both the nominal effect and for the
candidate effect. Note also that this effect is more pronounced in the north-south direc-
tion (v) than in the east-west (u). The adjusted R2 for this model is 0.95, and its AIC
is −228. The adjusted R2 for the global model is only 0.77, with an AIC of −192. The
adjusted R2 for the expansion model is only 0.82, with an AIC of −198. Thus, by these
measures, the spatial lag expansion method is superior.
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Figure 4.10: Map of spatially-varying effects for the spatially lagged expansion model. The left
map is of the base invalidation rate. The center map is of the neighbor effect. The right map
is of the vote proportion for Rajapaksa across Sri Lanka. Darker tones of orange correspond to
high negative effects, white to no effect, and darker tones of blue to positive effects.
Comparing these results to that of the geographically weighted regression model
tells a similar story. For the geographically weighted regression model, the (approximate)
adjusted R2 is 0.61; the AIC is −199; and the local R2 values range from 0.75 to 0.80.
To be useful, the spatial lagged expansion method also needs to be able to mitigate
any spatial correlation in the residuals. In this case, it did so. The lowest p-value for the
Moran’s local Ii measure is 0.2438. Thus, where the global model had spatial correlation
in the residuals, this model does not.
Figure 4.10 shows maps of the varying effects across Sri Lanka. The right map
is of the candidate effect. Note that the candidate effect is strongest in both the north
and the south, and both are negative. This negative effect strongly implies a significant
relationship between the invalidation rate and the candidate support rate in those areas.
This is a violation of the free and fair hypothesis. That the values are negative indicates
higher candidate support corresponds to a lower invalidation rate. This is consistent with
the effects of ballot box stuffing and some other forms of election fraud.
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The left map is of the nominal invalidation rate, with shades of blue signifying
a positive effect. Note that there are high nominal invalidation rates in both the north
and the south. This map implies that the base invalidation rate is high in the north and
the south. This is a also a violation of the free and fair hypothesis. These results are
consistent with an inherent unfairness in the electoral system. Future analysis should
focus on how those two regions are different from the middle region.
Finally, the middle map is of the neighbor effect, also known as the contagion
effect. Note that this is always positive and is strongest in the north. While this is not
directly a violation of the free and fair hypothesis, it does raise a troubling question:
Why is the data-generating process in the north different from that in the south?
4.6.2 Conclusion. In this section, I introduced the spatial lag expansion model—a
geographically-based method that combines the strengths of the spatial lag model and
the expansion method while keeping the native ability to perform hypothesis tests, which
the geographically weighted regression model does not have.
With the new method, I again tackled the 2010 Sri Lankan presidential election
to test the official results for violations of the free and fair hypothesis. Again, we find the
election falls short of the democratic goal. The fact that this model allows for a spatially
varying contagion effect is a strength.
4.7. Type I and Type II Error Rates
While the spatial lag expansion method did seem to exceed the performance of the current
three methods, this improvement may simply be a matter of the Sri Lankan data. As
with previous chapters, the methods must be tested against two benchmarks: the Type
I Error rate and the power.
In previous chapters, testing the Type I Error rate was relatively easy. The null
hypothesis is the independence of the invalidation rate and the candidate support. Here,
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there is the added issue of spatial correlation. The null hypothesis does not concern
this. As such, the Type I Error rate needs to be tested using several levels of spatial
correlation. As its effect on estimation appears to be minor, I dismiss it below.
Also new to this chapter is the importance of positional relationships. To investi-
gate how this affect power and other aspects, I use three maps: Belgium (GADM 2014a),
Sweden (GADM 2014a), and a regular grid (Anselin et al. 2005). I selected Belgium as
the number of electoral divisions is small (11 provinces), forcing me to examine small-
sample properties. I selected Sweden because the divisions (21 counties; län) had few
neighbors in the north. I selected the 5× 5 regular grid as a counterpoint to Sweden in
terms of connectivity and to Belgium in terms of size.
4.7.1 Effects of Spatial Correlation. Varying levels of spatial correlation can
be generated using a bivariate Normal distribution. That is, if the positions of the n
electoral divisions are (x,y)i, then one can generate spatially correlated data using
C ∼ Nn (µ;σ2Σ)
where C is the variable being generated (the candidate support rate), µ is a vector of
expected values, σ2 is the nominal variance, and Σij = exp [−φdij]. Here, φ is a measure
of spatial correlation and dij is the distance between electoral divisions i and j. If φ ≤ 0,
then the correlation matrix is singular.
Once the spatial correlation level is specified, independently-generated invalida-
tion rates and candidate support rates can be generated, each generation being a new
simulated election. This I do for correlation values of ρ = 0.0, 0.5, and 0.9 (Figure 4.11).
It is important to note that the power curves do not appear to vary due to changing
correlation.
While this graphic is only for varying the contagion effect for the 5 × 5 grid, the
effects were similarly interesting for the maps of Belgium and Sweden. This is good as
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Figure 4.11: Power curve for the effect of contamination on the rejection rate, separated by
estimation method and level of contagion. Note that neither estimation method nor contagion
level affects the power curve.
it means these two estimation methods are robust to the contagion effect. It also means
one fewer variable to investigate in power calculations.
4.7.2 The Test Statistics. While I suggested that the spatially lagged expansion
method has a natural inferential test, such is not strictly the case. Least squares re-
gression assumes that the model is properly specified. This is problematic due to the
paucity of information regarding election distributions. In Section 4.6, I suggested using
a quadratic model. This is only appropriate if the quadratic model is correct. As we
have no a priori information about what model would be correct, we cannot blindly rely
on the usual t-tests, especially if we want to optimize the power of the test. In lieu of
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Figure 4.12: The empirical CDF of test statistic as compared to the CDF of the χ26 distribution.
Note that the asymptotic distribution is stochastically greater than the observed distribution; it
is of less power.
using the asymptotic distribution, I suggest using simulation to obtain the distribution of
an appropriate test statistic. In this research, I used the difference of the log-likelihood
of the full model and the log-likelihood of the reduced model (the model without the
candidate effect). If this difference is high, then there is support for concluding that the
candidate support rate is an important predictor of the invalidation rate. If this ratio is
close to 1, then there is little support for such a conclusion.
Figure 4.12 is a graphic of the empirical cumulative distribution functions for the
observed test statistic and for its asymptotic distribution, χ26. Note that the asymptotic
distribution is stochastically less than the observed distribution. As such, it will be a
conservative test of the null hypothesis. This makes it a valid, albeit weak, test. For
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Country SLEM GWR n
Belgium 1.5122 0.0175 11
Sweden 1.1740 0.0073 21
Grid 1.1199 0.0048 25
Table 4.6: Estimated critical values for the test statistics of each estimation method and for
each map. SLEM’s is based on the ratio of the log-likelihoods of the full model to the restricted
model; GWR’s on the pseudo p-values. All correspond to α = 0.05. The final column, n,
provides the number of electoral divisions in the map. All critical values are estimated based on
100,000 iterations.
the grid, one would reject when the test statistic is greater than 12.59 when using the
asymptotic distribution, but at only 8.89 when using the simulated distribution.
Geographically weighted regression has similar issues. Because of the lack of true
number of degrees of freedom, and due to multiple testing issues, the distribution of
a test statistic must also be estimated for GWR. This test statistic needs to take into
consideration the estimated degrees of freedom, the local standard errors, and the local
effect estimates. To combine these three, I use the calculated pseudo p-value for each
division. The final test statistic is the minimum of these pseudo p-values.
Table 4.6 provides the estimated critical values to four decimal places. These are
estimated using 100,000 elections generated under the null hypothesis with zero contagion
effect. Note that for GWR, the Bonferroni adjustment is very conservative, as expected.
4.7.3 Power and Irregularities. For each of the three maps, I created elections
where the invalidation rate depended on two things to varying degrees: position (lati-
tude and longitude) and candidate support. Because of the small number of divisions, I
included linear functions of these, transforming to ensure that the invalidation rate was
bounded between 0 and 1. Finally, as it was the independent variable, the candidate sup-
port rate was drawn from a multivariate Normal distribution with a random correlation
structure, which was kept constant for the entire simulation run. Keeping the structure
constant allowed me to show that the power curves are dependent on that structure.
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For Sweden and the grid, the reduced model consisted of interaction terms of the
latitude, longitude, and neighborhood-average invalidation rate. For Belgium, due to the
number of parameters and divisions, only the additive terms were included. In all cases,
the full model included these terms along with their products with the candidate support
rate.
I varied the candidate effect from 0.0 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1. I gave the latitude and
the longitude effects values of 0.000, 0.003, and 0.006, and their interaction effect values
of 0.000, −0.003, and −0.006. For reasons discussed in Section 4.7.1, I set the contagion
effect to be zero.
In summary, if u corresponds to latitude, v to longitude, ρ to contagion, and c to
the candidate, I varied the parameters as
βc = 0.0(0.1)1.0
βu = 0.000, 0.003, 0.006
βv = 0.000, 0.003, 0.006
βuv = 0.000,−0.003,−0.006
βρ = 0
Note that the latitude ranges from 0.5 to 4.5 for the grid, but from 49 to 51 for Belgium
and from 55 to 69 for Sweden—an increase of an order of 10. Because of this, I only used
0.0000 and 0.0001 for Belgium and Sweden for parameters βv and -βuv. That is, since
the latitudes were approximately 10 times larger for the two countries, I used latitude
effects that were approximately 10 times less.
Finally, GWR requires selecting a kernel and a bandwidth. As discussed in Section
4.5, the kernel is largely irrelevant; I selected the Gaussian kernel. In terms of the
bandwidth, I selected an adaptive bandwidth that optimizes the leave-one-out cross-
validation fit.
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Figure 4.13: Power curve for the effect of contamination on the rejection rate, separated by
estimation method and effect of longitude (βu). This corresponds to the regular grid map with
βv = βuv = 0.000.
The Results: For the grid, the results are very interesting in terms of power. Figure
4.13 provides the corresponding power curves as functions of the candidate effect (hor-
izontal axis), longitudinal effect (line type), and estimation method (line color), where
ρ = 0, βv = 0.00, and βuv = 0.00. The vertical segments correspond to 95% confidence
intervals for the observed rejection rate (based on 10, 000 iterations).
Note that the SLEM method (blue lines) tends to have a higher power than the
GWR method (red lines). Also note that both tend to increase as the effect of candidate
support increases from 0 to 1. More importantly, note that the GWR method does not
increase consistently. Similar results hold for setting βu to 0.00 and varying βv.
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Figure 4.14: Power curve for the effect of contamination on the rejection rate, separated by
estimation method and effects of longitude and latitude and both. This corresponds to the regular
grid map. Blue lines correspond to the SLEM power; red lines, GWR. Each curve corresponds
to a different combination of βu, βv, and βuv. The vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.
In lieu of showing many graphics telling the same story, or variations on a theme, I
provide Figure 4.14. This graphic shows the various power curves for the 5×5 grid. Blue
curves correspond to the power curves of SLEM; red curves, GWR. The lines correspond
to varying the candidate effect under different values of βu, βv, and βuv.
Note that the SLEM power curves, while not smooth, do tend to follow a typ-
ical power curve shape—within a band. They start low and increase with the level of
contamination. When the candidate effect is 1, the power of the SLEM test is near 1.
The GWR power curves, on the other hand, do not follow the typical power
curve shape as closely. They are incredibly variable, irregular, and erratic. They are
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very dependent on the latitude, longitude, and combined effects. The power is also
very dependent on the contamination level, to the point that the value of interpolating
between two power estimates is quite low. Furthermore, the GWR powers tend to be less
than the corresponding SLEM powers. This, and the irregular nature of the GWR power
curves, suggest that SLEM is superior to GWR in this aspect and for this geographical
geometry.
The next two maps differ in one particular way from this grid map: Belgium in
number of divisions, Sweden in compactness. Thus, we can examine the effect of each of
these two map aspects to determine how each affects the quality of the tests.
For Belgium, the story changes a little. Recall that the number of divisions in Belgium
(11 provincies) was much less than that in the grid, although both were quite compact.
Thus, this comparison should help us more clearly understand the effect of sample size
on the quality of the two tests.
Figure 4.15 provides all of the power curves for the various combinations of posi-
tional effects for increasing candidate effect. Again, blue curves correspond to powers for
the SLEM model; red curves, the GWR model. Note that there remains a lot of variation
in the power for a given candidate effect. This is true for both geographic models. For
instance, when the candidate effect is 1.00, the rejection rate ranges from approximately
0.25 to 0.85 for each model!
On the basis of this graphic, there is little comparison that can be made between
the two methods. Both are poor. Both are irregular. Both are of low power. This sug-
gests that the number of divisions is an important factor in the quality of the conclusions
from either method.
Finally, let us examine Sweden; the story changes a bit more. Recall that Sweden had
approximately the same number of divisions (län) as the grid (21 to 25), but was not as
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Figure 4.15: Power curve for the effect of contamination on the rejection rate, separated
by estimation method and effects of longitude and latitude and both. This corresponds to the
Belgium map. Blue lines correspond to the SLEM rejection rate; red lines, GWR. Each curve
corresponds to a different combination of βu, βv, and βuv. The vertical bars are 95% confidence
intervals.
compact. Thus, this comparison examines the effect of compactness on the quality of the
tests.
Figure 4.16 provides the power curves for the various combinations of positional
effects for increasing candidate effect. As usual, blue lines correspond to the SLEM
model; red lines, the GWR model.
Both SLEM and GWR have very low power when βuv 6= 0.000. This condition
corresponds to the curves that are flat until βc = 0.50 or greater (lighter colored curves).
Beyond these serious issues, the SLEM curves tend to be higher than the GWR curves.
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Figure 4.16: Power curve for the effect of contamination on the rejection rate, separated by
estimation method and effects of longitude and latitude and both. This corresponds to the Sweden
map. Blue lines correspond to the SLEM power; red lines, GWR. Each curve corresponds to a
different combination of βu, βv, and βuv. The vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Thus, from comparing the tests’ results on the grid to those on Sweden, we may
surmise that the effect of compactness is minor unless there is a cross-term effect. In
such cases, the power of either test is very small until the candidate effect is large.
4.8. Conclusion
Closing out the theory part of the dissertation, this chapter examined three current
methods of incorporating geography in regression methods. The spatial lag model is able
to reduce spatial correlation in the residuals, but it does not allow for modeling spatially-
varying effects. The spatial expansion method does model spatially-varying effects, but
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it does not handle contagion (neighbor) effects. The geographically weighted regression
method handles all of this, but hypothesis testing is not natively supported.
The method I introduced was the spatial lag expansion method. It is a combi-
nation of the spatial lag method and the expansion method. It allows for modeling the
contagion processes like the spatial lag model does, but it also allows for spatially-varying
effects. Finally, it allows for parameter testing as it fits easily within the usual regression
paradigm of Chapter 3. This allows one to use the appropriate regression method.
While SLEM does have a native testing paradigm, it should not be used unless
theory makes a certain functional form (linear, quadratic, etc.) natural. In all other
cases, to maximize power, the critical value should be estimated using simulation. In
doing this, SLEM tended to outperform GWR in terms of power.
Finally, I was able to begin investigating the effect of geometry on the tests. Both
tests performed better for the compact 5× 5 grid than they did for Belgium, which was
compact, but only had 11 divisions. For Belgium, both tests had low power and were
erratic.
Both tests also performed better for the compact 5 × 5 grid than for the non-
compact Sweden. The biggest impact happened when there were cross-positional effects.
When the latitude and longitude effects were additive, the two tests performed much like
they did in the case of the grid. In other words, geometry matters.
In the next two chapters, I apply all of the best methods discussed in these last
three chapters to two cases. The first case is the South Sudanese Unity referendum of 2011
(Chapter 5). The second case is the 2008 US Presidential election in Colorado (Chapter
6). The former case shows clear evidence of violations of the free and fair hypothesis.
The latter case does not fail any of the tests, lending credence to the assertion that the
election was free and fair.
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CHAPTER 5
APPLICATION: SOUTHERN SUDAN, 2011
Southern Sudan, 2011. During the colonial period, the United Kingdom ruled
northern Sudan separately from southern Sudan. However, when the Republic of Sudan
became independent, it was as a single, unitary entity. When it became clear that
independence meant a unified Sudan, Southerners began a guerilla campaign—later a
military campaign—to wrest a separate independence. The civil war lasted from 1955 to
1972 and caused almost a half million deaths (Collins 2008).
The First Sudanese Civil War ended with the Addis Ababa Accords of 1972. This
peace treaty resulted in the formation of an autonomous zone in southern Sudan (Johnson
2011). During the lifetime of the treaty, tensions eased and the South was not in open
rebellion. However, President Gaafar Nimeiry revoked the treaty—and the Sudanese
constitution—in 1983, putting all of Sudan under Shari'a Law. Almost immediately, the
South rebelled, starting the Second Sudanese Civil War.
After 22 years and almost two million dead, the government of Sudan and the lead-
ers of the South signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, containing eight separate
protocols designed to settle the “Southern Question.” The most important aspect of this
agreement was that popular referenda would be held across Sudan allowing southerners
to vote on the future relationship between the North and the South (Collins 2008).
According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Naivasha Agreement), south-
ern Sudan was divided into 12 states, plus the Abyei Area. All were to have held their
referenda simultaneously in January 2011. However, ambiguities in the agreement’s word-
ing allowed Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to suspend the referendum process in the
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Figure 5.1: Ballot paper for the South Sudanese unification referendum of 2011. The languages
are English and Sudanese Arabic. The hand symbols are for those who know neither language.
The voter is to place a thumbprint in indelible ink in the appropriate circle. The use of indelible
ink also ensures people vote at most once.
Abyei area; the governor of South Kurdufan suspended the referendum process because
of personal ties to the Sudanese President; and lingering northern military action against
southern rebels allowed its governor to indefinitely postpone the referendum process in
Blue Nile state. Thus, January 2011 saw residents of only 10 of the 13 regions (12
southern states and Abyei) vote in the independence referendum.
As expected, the official count showed strong support for independence. Offi-
cially, 98.8% of the registered voters cast valid ballots for independence from Sudan
(Sudan 2011). The support for succession at the state level ranged from 50.06% in North
Kordufan (in Sudan) to 99.98% in Unity (in South Sudan).
Election observers included former US President James Carter, former UN Secre-
tary General Kofi Annan, and current actor George Clooney. The Carter Center group
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visited both President al-Bashir and First Vice President Salva Kiir (the future president
of the Republic of South Sudan). The group visited several polling stations. Carter
(2011) reported
Before leaving Sudan early on January 16, voter turnout had exceeded 90
percent in the South and 40 percent in the North among the 618 sites visited
by our observers. A few sites in S. Sudan had 100 percent turnout and were
practically unanimous for independence. The entire exercise was orderly,
pleasant, and productive, and it is expected that the official returns will lead
to a new nation, and that The Carter Center will remain involved in both
countries in promoting peace, democracy, and better health and education.
However, even without charges of fraud and reports of irregularities, certain facts raise
questions. Ten counties reported no votes for unity, and 21 reported fewer than five. The
average number of votes in these 21 counties was over 35,000. Furthermore, 12 counties
reported no invalidated ballots; that is, the government stated that the voters in those
12 counties all filled out their ballots perfectly. The remaining 91 electoral divisions
averaged invalidation counts of just 68. Most interestingly, the invalidation rate differed
significantly between the northern voters (3.2%), the out-of-country voters (0.3%), and
the southern voters (0.1%).
On its face, these results are not compatible with the ‘Free and Fair’ hypothesis.
And yet, the US Ambassador to the United Nations (Rice 2011) did not question the
vote’s outcome
On behalf of the people of the United States, let me again congratulate the
people of South Sudan for a successful and historic referendum in which the
overwhelming majority of voters chose independence.
Nor did she question the vote’s legitimacy.
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5.1. Introduction
The previous three chapters provided several tests of the free and fair hypothesis, each
centered on a given level of data provided. In this election, the government of South Sudan
provided much information: counts of invalidations, blank ballots, referendum support,
and total ballots. The Global Administrative Areas database also provides shapefiles,
allowing geographic analysis (GADM 2014b). Unfortunately, the division names in the
voting records do not match the third-level divisions in the shapefiles. Thus, just for the
geographic tests, the data are aggregated to the 10 second-level administrative divisions
(states).
5.2. Digit Test
In Chapter 2, I covered several options for improving upon the current Benford test.
None were good. The empirical Benford tests both suffered from low power, thus making
them almost useless. The generalized Benford tests had very high power, which meant
they easily rejected the fair hypothesis. Of all five tests, I weakly suggested using the
Likelihood Simulation test as a gatekeeper. If the election passed that test, then there
was no evidence of count tampering; if it failed, there was little evidence of it.
Thus, I perform the Likelihood Simulation test on the full election returns. Figure
5.2 provides a histogram of the simulated log-likelihoods, with the observed log-likelihood,
−223.9304, indicated. This value corresponds to an approximate p-value of 0.0012. This
is much less than the usual α = 0.05. As such, we cannot conclude that there is no
evidence of people manually changing the election counts. While this is not strong
evidence, it does raise a flag in this election. Let us keep it in mind.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of the log-likelihood for the 2011 South Sudanese unity referendum.
The observed test statistic, −223.9 is indicated on the graphic.
5.3. Regression Tests
In Chapter 3, I examined two complementary aspects of testing. The first concerned the
appropriate least squares regression method. I concluded that feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS) was the best, while noting that weighted least squares (WLS) would be
similar in terms of estimation and would tend to be slightly faster.
The second aspect concerned estimating division membership into two popula-
tions: those that were fair and those that were not. Here, I concluded that the grid
search was better than the Bayesian method in terms of mean square error and time.
The drawback is that the usual test statistic no longer follows its expected distribution;
the distribution must be simulated.
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Figure 5.3: Invalidation plot for the 2011 South Sudanese referendum. The optimal threshold
is τ̂ = 0.942.
Figure 5.3 is the invalidation plot for this election. The grid search produced an
optimal threshold of τ̂ = 0.942. The estimated candidate effect for those divisions with
independence support greater than 0.942 is −0.133, which is also practically significant.
The observed t-value is −5.938, which would correspond to a p-value of 1.42 × 10−7 if
the test statistic followed the usual distribution. Simulation of the test statistic under
the null hypothesis gives an estimated central 95% confidence interval of −2.78 to 2.74
and an estimated p-value of 0.0013.
Thus, based on this test, we can conclude that there is significant evidence of
unfairness in this election. The data support the contention that those voting in favor




Finally, Chapter 4 covered the effects of geography and how best to handle it. The current
‘gold standard,’ geographically weighted regression (GWR), performed well in comparison
to my suggestion of spatial lag expansion method (SLEM). Neither performed well when
the number of divisions was low (e.g., Belgium). Both performed well when the number
of divisions was high and the map was compact (e.g., the grid).
South Sudan is more like Belgium than the grid. Because of data-matching issues,
I must aggregate to the state level, and South Sudan has only 10 states.
Using 10,000 iterations, I estimated the critical value of the GWR test to be 0.026
and of the SLEM test to be 31.46. These led to estimated p-values of 0.0002 from GWR
and 0.0268 from SLEM.
Figure 5.4 provides maps of the candidate effects estimated by the GWR method;
Figure 5.5, the SLEM method. In both cases, all estimated effects are negative, which
echoes the conclusions of Section 5.3.
The GWR method estimates that the candidate effect ranges from −0.102 to
−0.095. Thus, GWR does not suggest a strongly spatially varying candidate effect. On
the other hand, the SLEM method estimates that the candidate effect ranges from −0.255
to −0.071, which does suggest a strong effect of space on the candidate effect. Note that
Section 5.3 estimated the candidate effect to be −0.133, which is not within the GWR
range but is within the SLEM range.
In either case, there is statistically significant evidence for a violation of the free
and fair hypothesis in this election (pGWR = 0.0002; pSLEM = 0.0268).
5.5. Using Additional Information
In Section 5.3, I used the general techniques discussed in Chapter 3. This election,
however, has additional information that should not be discarded.
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Figure 5.4: Maps of the candidate effects for the GWR method. Darker oranges correspond
to higher (negative) candidate effects. Shades are equivalent across this and Figure 5.5.
The South Sudanese referendum had citizens cast ballots across the world. In
foreign countries, the ballots were cast in Sudanese consulates and forwarded to the
elections commission in Juba, South Sudan, for counting. In northern Sudan, the ballots
cast in the electoral divisions were counted in situ. Those ballots cast in South Sudan
were counted in South Sudan. Thus, there are potentially two populations: ballots
counted in Sudan and ballots counted in South Sudan.
Figure 5.6 provides the invalidation plot for this partitioning. Notice that, with
one exception (Raga County in Bahr el Ghazal state), those ballots counted in Sudan
correspond to those in the left section of Figure 5.3. Thus, the “blind” grid search was
able to identify that these ballots were counted under a different process than the others.
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Figure 5.5: Maps of the candidate effects for the SLEM method. Darker oranges correspond
to higher (negative) candidate effects. Shades are equivalent across this and Figure 5.4.
For the record, the candidate effect for the Sudanese-counted ballots (green) is
0.03661, with a p-value of 0.421; for the South Sudanese-counted ballots, −0.079360
(p < 0.0001). Thus, we again have evidence that the election was not fair. Now, however,
we can point to a problem with the ballots counted in the southern divisions.
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I illustrated how to implement the tests of the previous three chapters
in a real election. In 2011, the self-identified citizens of South Sudan went to the polls to
voice their hopes for an independent future.
The government of South Sudan reported that 3,769,350 voted in favor of inde-
pendence and 44,877 voted for continuing the current political situation with Sudan.
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Figure 5.6: Invalidation plot for the 2011 South Sudanese referendum. The divisions are
colored based on where the ballots were counted. Those in green were counted in Sudan; in
orange, in South Sudan.
Twenty-one counties reported fewer than five invalidated ballots, raising concerns about
the fairness of the vote.
The Likelihood Simulation method, testing the reported vote counts for indepen-
dence, concluded that the reported results did not meet expectations. However, recall
from Chapter 2 that even failing this test is not strong evidence against the claim of
fairness. It is, at most, a red flag that vote counts may have been manually adjusted.
Weighted least squares on two populations provided that strong evidence, how-
ever. Not only was the candidate effect statistically significant (p = 0.0013), but it was
substantively significant (βc = −0.13).
Finally, the two geographical methods both concluded that there was a statistically
significant candidate effect. They did, however, disagree on whether that effect varied
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across the map or was essentially constant: SLEM concluded it varied spatially from
−0.255 to −0.071, GWR did not.
Thus, taking these results as a whole, I conclude that this election was not fair
to those voting for unity with Sudan. I cannot conclude that this inequality was due
to election fraud or to an unfair electoral system. I can say, however, that there is no
evidence that more people voted for unity than for independence. In other words, the




Colorado, 2008. The United States holds presidential elections every four years, on
years evenly divisible by four. The president is elected by the Electoral College, which is
comprised of 538 members selected from the 51 federal members. Strictly speaking, those
51 members (50 states and the District of Columbia) are not all states, but I shall refer
to them as such. The size of the state delegation equals the size of its federal delegation
(Article II). The size of the delegation from the District of Columbia is set by the US
Constitution at 3 (Amendment 23).
The Electors vote at their individual statehouses on the Monday after the second
Wednesday of December, (December 15, 2008, in this election) and forward their votes
(one for president and one for vice-president) to the President of the US Senate, who
brings them to the joint session of the US Congress. Four tellers, one from each party in
each chamber, count them before the new members of Congress (3 USC 1).
The voters chose these Electors on the Tuesday after the first Monday of Novem-
ber. In all states, the Electors are presented as a slate. In 49 states, a single slate of
Electors win the state. Maine and Nebraska use the Massachusetts method: two electors
are chosen at the state level and one from each Congressional district. Thus, it is the
51 state-level and 5 Congressional District-level jurisdictions that hold the elections, not
the unitary federal system.
The 2008 US Presidential election pitted Republican Senator John McCain against
Democratic Senator Barack Obama. The incumbent president was George W. Bush, who
belonged to the same party as Senator McCain. Due to several missteps in the McCain
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campaign and to the fact that solidly Democratic states controlled over 300 electoral
votes, the winner of the Presidential election was known well before the ballots were
cast.
The US state of Colorado is the eighth largest in terms of area; the 22nd in terms
of population. While it is termed a “purple mountain” state in reference to its balance
of Democratic (blue) and Republican (red) voters, the opinion polls in Colorado had
Obama leading McCain by 7–10%, thus polling analysts forecasted this purple mountain
state blue.
November 4th came and went. Senator Obama carried Colorado by almost 9%.
Senator McCain did not call for an investigation, which would have been tantamount to
declaring electoral fraud had taken place. There were no protests, no riots, no deaths
due to the election. Compared to the other elections discussed in this dissertation, it was
boring. As such, there is no expectation of detecting fraud here.
However, there is interesting structure to the results—a structure that hints at
election-day problems.
6.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I examined the 2011 Unity Referendum of South Sudan using the
techniques discussed in the first four chapters of this dissertation. Because of the dearth
of information, there was little to be done beyond examining the relationship between
the invalidation rate and independence support.
Colorado offers much more information. While I still apply the basic tests dis-
cussed in Chapters 2 to 4, I follow up using the additional available demographic infor-
mation. Since Colorado is one of 50 states in the United States of America, a census was
taken there in 2010. Thus, that demographic information is relatively recent and useful.
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Figure 6.1: A map of the US state of Colorado. Note that the number of divisions (n=65)
and its relative compactness makes is similar to the grid of Chapter 4.
6.2. Digit Test
Recall Chapter 2 in which I covered several options for improving upon the current Ben-
ford test—none were excellent. The empirical Benford tests both suffered from low power,
and the generalized Benford tests suffered from high sensitivity to the null distribution.
Of all tests, I weakly suggested using the Likelihood Simulation test as a gatekeeper. If
the election passed that test, then there was no evidence of count tampering; if it failed,
there was little evidence of it.
Thus, I perform the Likelihood Simulation test on the full election returns. Figure
6.2 provides a histogram of the simulated log-likelihoods, with the observed log-likelihood,
−128.9435, indicated. This value corresponds to an estimated p-value of 0.633 on one-
million iterations. This is greater than the usual α = 0.05. As such, there is no evidence
of people manually changing the election counts.
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of the log-likelihood for the 2008 Coloradoan presidential election.
The observed test statistic, −128.9 is indicated on the graphic.
This is not a surprise. Before election day, Senator Obama was predicted to win
Colorado by a margin of between 7 and 10%. Thus, even had there been the ability to
carry out a systematic fraud campaign, it would have had to be of such magnitude to
make it obvious.
6.3. Regression Test
In Chapter 3, I concluded that using weighted least squares regression in combination
with a grid search for the optimal breakpoint would allow one to better test if the inval-
idation rate was independent of the candidate support rate.
Figure 6.3 is the invalidation plot for this election. The grid search produced
an optimal threshold of τ̂ = 0.716. The estimated candidate effect for those divisions
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Figure 6.3: Invalidation plot for the 2008 Coloradoan presidential election. The optimal
threshold is τ̂ = 0.716.
with independence support greater than 0.716 is −0.2302, which is practically significant.
The observed t-value is −1.601, which would correspond to a p-value of 0.170 if the test
statistic followed the usual distribution.
Figure 6.4 is a histogram of the simulated test statistics under the null hypothesis.
This produces a central 95% confidence interval of −2.74 to 2.79 and an estimated p-value
of 0.275, which is much greater than the usual α = 0.05.
Thus, based on this test, we cannot conclude that there is significant evidence
of unfairness in this election. The inherent randomness of election returns is likely the
reason behind the steep slope of the right line. Again, as with the digit test above, I
had no expectation of this election showing signs of electoral tampering or of political
unfairness.
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Figure 6.4: The estimated distribution of the test statistic for the Colorado election, with the
observed value shown. A 95% confidence interval is from −2.74 to 2.79 on 10,000 iterations.
6.4. Geography
Next, Chapter 4 covered the effects of geography and how best to handle it. The current
‘gold standard,’ geographically weighted regression (GWR), performed well in comparison
to my suggestion of spatial lag expansion method (SLEM). Neither performed well when
the number of divisions was low (e.g., Belgium). Both performed well when the number
of divisions was high and the map was compact (e.g., the grid). Colorado fits into this
latter group. As such, I would expect both tests to be of high power, with the SLEM
test being slightly more powerful than the GWR test.
Figure 6.5 shows the invalidation rate for each of Colorado’s 66 counties (Geo-
Commons 2014). The rate ranges from 0.10% in Pitkin County (west central) to 4.34%
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Figure 6.5: A map of the observed invalidation rate for Colorado in the 2008 Presidential
election. Note the hot spots in the east and south.
in Costilla County (central south). In addition to the southern area, the northern east-
ern area also has a higher than average invalidation rate, with a 3.82% rejection rate in
Yuma County. These findings suggest that geography may play a role here, that effects
are spatially varying in this election.
To determine if, and to what extent, geography is a factor, I performed the rec-
ommended tests of Chapter 4. As the number of divisions was not small, I used the
interaction model for SLEM; that is, I used latitude, longitude, and their product. Using
10,000 iterations, I estimated the critical value of the GWR test to be 2.45× 10−9, and
of the SLEM test to be 12.575. The observed test statistics were 1.10× 10−7 and 8.867,
respectively. The resulting estimated p-values were 0.1365 and 0.1868. Neither of these
is less than the usual α = 0.05.
Thus, there is no evidence that the invalidation rate pattern is anything other
than random noise. Figure 6.6 provides maps of the candidate effects estimated by the
two methods. The left panel maps the effects estimated using GWR; the right, SLEM.
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Figure 6.6: Maps of the candidate effects for the two methods. The GWR results are the left
map; SLEM, right map. Darker oranges correspond to higher negative candidate effects, blue
to higher positive effects. Shades are equivalent across maps, ranging from +0.10 to −0.10.
6.5. More Geography
As a part of the United States of America, Colorado had a census taken in 2010, just two
years after this election. Beyond a simple counting, the census estimates demographic
information. Thus, to extend these methods, I will also include demographic information
to further test if the election was fair to all tested groups.
As usual, the dependent variable for the model is the proportion of votes invali-
dated in the county (Figure 6.5). However, because of the amount of data available, the
candidate support rate is not the only independent variable. Initially, the independent
variables are the proportion of the vote for McCain and several demographic variables:
turnout rate, percent older than 65, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent
Hispanic, percent speaking English as a non-native language, percent with High School
Diploma, the percent with Bachelors Degree, and the poverty rate. All of these variables
are measured at the county level.
Because of multicollinearity, many of these variables are excluded from the final
model. Table 6.1 provides summary statistics of these variables, including three measures
of global spatial correlation (Anselin 1995; Getis and Ord 1997). That the independent
variables are spatially varying, and that the dependent variable is spatially varying sug-
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Mean St Dev I C G Normality
Invalidation percent 1.10 0.81 0.370* 0.568* 0.091* <0.001
Vote for Obama 45.25 15.34 0.357* 0.582* 0.088* 0.1186
Vote for McCain 52.85 15.28 0.363* 0.577* 0.078 0.1155
Turnout rate 89.64 3.66 0.119* 0.884 0.080 0.0100
White 93.18 4.00 0.248* 0.697* 0.080 <0.001
Black 1.72 2.37 0.216* 0.781 0.125* <0.001
Hispanic 19.21 14.30 0.399* 0.586* 0.100* <0.001
English not first language 14.15 9.92 0.209* 0.748* 0.091* <0.001
Percent graduating high school 88.14 6.23 0.277* 0.721* 0.080 0.0181
Percent with bachelors degree 28.80 12.42 0.343* 0.637* 0.089* <0.001
Poverty rate 12.86 5.57 0.428* 0.578* 0.084 0.0842
Elderly rate 14.88 4.88 0.300* 0.637* 0.079 0.0814
Female 48.06 3.74 -0.063 1.001 0.079 <0.001
Table 6.1: Univariate summary statistics of the variables under consideration in this research.
The three measures of global spatial correlation are Moran’s I, Geary’s C, and Getis and Ord’s
G. Stars represent statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level. The value for Normality is the
p-value associated with the Shapiro-Wilk test.
gests that geography may matter in finding relationships between the dependent and the
independent variables. Regardless, the effect of the parameters may be spatially-varying.
Before settling on a model, one needs to examine multicollinearity in the indepen-
dent variables. Not surprisingly, significant multicollinearity exists in several variables.
Percents black and white are highly correlated. As such, I arbitrarily included percent
black and excluded percent white. That Hispanic and English as a non-native language
rates were correlated is not surprising (I retained English as a non-native language in the
regression). However, the education variables were also collinear with these two (neither
included). McCain support and Obama support were highly correlated, so I included just
the McCain support (the Republicans were the incumbent party at the national level).
Thus, the final model includes the usual dependent (invalidation rate) and in-
dependent (McCain support) variables. Also included are turnout rate, percent black,
percent non-native English speaker, poverty rate, percent elderly, and percent female. If
the effect of any of these seven variables is statistically significant at the county level,
there is evidence of some level and type of unfairness in this election.
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Figure 6.7: Maps of the effects of turnout on the invalidation rate for the two methods. The
GWR results are the left map; SLEM, right map. Darker oranges correspond to higher positive
effects, green to higher negative effects. Shades are equivalent across maps, ranging from +0.10
to −0.10.
As a whole, the GWR model is not significantly different from the null model
using only neighborhood average and geographical position as predictors (p = 0.635),
but the SLEM model is (p = 0.0003). This indicates that the SLEM model detected
demographic or political effects that GWR did not.
Testing for statistical significance is a matter of calculating the test statistic (dif-
ference in log-likelihoods) for each variable against the model omitting that variable. The
distribution of these test statistics can be estimated using simulation, which I did using
10,000 iterations.
The following sections cover only three of the variables, as I found these the most
interesting. As the GWR model was not significantly different from the null model, I will
not discuss the statistical significance of any of the variables. As the SLEM model was
statistically significant, I do discuss the significance of the three variables below.
6.5.1 Turnout. Let us first look at the effect of turnout on the invalidation rate,
controlling for all other variables discussed above. The two maps are given in Figure
6.7, with the left map being the GWR estimates and the right map being the SLEM
estimates (p = 0.0436). The SLEM method indicates a much higher effect of turnout on
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Figure 6.8: Maps of the effects of the poverty rate on the invalidation rate for the two methods.
The GWR results are the left map; SLEM, right map. Darker oranges correspond to higher
positive effects, green to higher negative effects. Shades are equivalent across maps, ranging
from +0.35 to −0.35.
the invalidation rate, 0.298; GWR predicts the highest effect is only 0.115. Both suggest
a high effect in the northeastern corner of the state, which actually had above-average
turnout. This suggests the vote counters may have suffered from fatigue. This observation
explains the higher-than-average invalidation rate in Yuma County (see Figure 6.5).
6.5.2 Poverty. In terms of the effect of the poverty rate on the invalidation rate, the
SLEM model predicts much higher effect than the GWR model (Figure 6.8). The highest
effect predicted by GWR is 0.081, whereas the highest effect predicted by SLEM is 0.302
(p = 0.0019). The areas of intensity also differ across the two models. GWR has the
highest effects in the west, while SLEM has them in the east: northeast with the highest
negative effect, southeast with the highest positive effect.
6.5.3 Candidate Effect. Finally, let us examine the candidate effect, controlling for
these other variables (Figure 6.9). Again, note that SLEM predicts higher effects than
does GWR. Both predict high positive effect in the northeast and high positive effect in
the south. However, the SLEM effect is not statistically significant at the usual α = 0.05
level (p = 0.0509).
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Figure 6.9: Maps of the candidate (McCain) effects on the invalidation rate for the two
methods. The GWR results are the left map; SLEM, right map. Darker oranges correspond
to higher positive effects, green to higher negative effects. Shades are equivalent across maps,
ranging from +0.10 to −0.10.
With that said, it is interesting that the significance level is so close to α. It raises
questions. Perhaps there is an interaction effect or a quadratic effect not captured in
the SLEM model. Note that the northeast region also had a significant effect on the
invalidation rate by the turnout. Could this effect not be sufficiently covered? Perhaps.
6.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, the second of two case-study chapters, I analyzed the 2008 Coloradoan
presidential election with the expectation of no political-based unfairness. The usual
analysis in Sections 6.2 through 6.4 supported this conclusion. The digit test, the regres-
sion test, and the SLEM all failed to find a statistically significant relationship between
the invalidation rate and the candidate (McCain) support rate.
In Section 6.5 extended the usual geographic analysis to include additional infor-
mation. As Colorado is a part of the United States, a census is taken every year ending
with a zero. This census offers interesting demographic variables that can be added to
the models.
In doing this, the GWR model was not a statistically significant improvement over
the null model, but the SLEM model was. I then discussed the estimated effects of three
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of the independent variables, turnout, poverty, and candidate support. Strictly holding
to the α = 0.05 level, the first two were significant—both statistically and practically.
The effect of turnout could indicate counting fatigue. The effect of poverty could indicate
issues with voter preparation.
The candidate effect was not statistically significant, but just barely. On 10,000 it-
erations, the estimated p-value was p̂ = 0.051. This raised an interesting question: Why is
the candidate effect now (almost) significant? The temptation is to continue exploring the
data, finding relationships and non-relationships. Unfortunately, once that happens, the
tests become more about the data rather than the underlying data-generating-processes—
a cardinal sin because the purpose of statistical analysis is to better understand the




In the previous chapters, I gave a firmer foundation to electoral forensics, the discipline
that applies statistical techniques to election returns to determine if there is evidence of
unfairness. Chapters 2 through 4 introduced, modified, and tested several statistical
techniques in the hopes that they would allow us to better understand the election
process.
Chapter 2 covered digit tests—tests that can be used when the government pub-
lishes vote counts at the division level. At their foundation, these were based on the
original observation by Newcomb (1881) that the early pages in a book of logarithm ta-
bles wore faster than those later in the book. Benford (1938) used Newcomb’s observation
and showed that they could be used to distinguish between natural digit distributions
and artificial ones. It is here that digit tests were born.
I examined the current Benford test and found it wanting. I generalized it by
including the effect of division size and showed that tests based on the generalized Benford
test were much better as statistical tests, but because the distribution of counts in a fair
election is unknown, it may be dangerous to use it at this point.
So, instead of using the generalized Benford test to generate expected distribu-
tions, I tested two bootstrapping routines. The first is based on the assumption that the
proportion of the vote for a given candidate (candidate support rate) follows a Logit-
Normal distribution. The second is based on the non-parametric bootstrap. Both could
be “tuned” so that the Type I Error rate was nominal. Neither were powerful.
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Chapter 3 covered three versions of least squares regression—tests that can be
used when the government gives both the vote count and the invalidation count. In the
presence of invalidation, the free and fair hypothesis implies that the invalidation rate and
the candidate support rate are independent. This chapter covered ways of allowing the
computer to automatically determine the presence of two populations—fair and unfair
divisions—and to determine if the resulting estimated candidate effects were significantly
different from zero.
After examining three least squares methods, ordinary least squares, weighted
least squares, and feasible generalized least squares, I concluded that feasible general least
squares was best in terms of theory, but gave values very similar to those of weighted
least squares, which did not need to iterate. Thus, I suggested weighted least squares
would be an appropriate method.
In terms of detecting the existence of two populations, I tested a grid search, the
Healy-Westmacott estimator (Healy and Westmacott 1956), and an empirical Bayesian
method. Both the grid and the Bayesian methods gave good estimates of a threshold
effect, those divisions with candidate support greater than this threshold were more likely
to be unfair divisions. The Bayesian method was slower, however. The Healy-Westmacott
method did not respect the threshold.
Thus, I closed Chapter 3 suggesting a combination of using weighted least squares
regression and the grid search.
Chapter 4 extended its previous chapter and took geography into consideration.
As it is based on people, voting is an inherently geographic process. I covered three
current regression methods and proposed my own, the spatial lag expansion method
(SLEM).
The current gold standard is geographically weighted regression (GWR). In com-
paring my new method to this, I discovered that both have poor power when dealing
with maps that have too few divisions. I also discovered that the SLEM method has
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poor power when dealing with non-compact maps. In all other examined cases, SLEM
barely outperformed GWR.
Chapters 5 and 6 showed how to apply these techniques to test the “free and fair”
claim of democratic elections. The former covered the South Sudanese Unity referendum
of 2011; the latter, the 2008 Presidential election in Colorado.
The former case was straight-forward and typical of most countries in the world.
The amount of information is limited to the election; censuses are rare and rarely helpful.
Thus, demographic information is precious. I use Colorado to show what can be done
when that information is present.
7.1. Future Work
This research did not go smoothly. However, to quote Isaac Asimov,
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discov-
eries, is not “Eureka!”, but “That’s funny . . . ”
There have been a few “That’s funny” moments. Some led to answers, others to future
research.
I believe I have exhausted the Benford test and its ilk (Chapter 2). Any further
advancements in this area would require determining the correct “null distribution” of
vote counts. I have shown that the Benford distribution is not correct. I believe I have
shown that the generalized Benford distribution is also lacking. In fact, the two boot-
strapping methods appear to suggest that this line of inquiry is destined for low power.
With this said, I find it interesting that the generalized tests rejected the Norwegian and
Irish elections. Could the geometry of the election be a factor?
In Chapter 3, I concluded that weighted least squares (WLS) was preferred to
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This statement is misleading. Throughout that
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“lost week,” I struggled trying to find out why OLS performed better than WLS in my
simulations. The nominal Type I Error rate for OLS was approximately 0.05, while that
of WLS was approximately 0.10. This made absolutely no sense from my understanding
of the underlying theory.
It turns out that William T. Dickens (1990) showed that weighted least squares,
when the weights are based on populations, will rarely outperform ordinary least squares.
The cause is the same issue underlying a lot of the complications in elections research:
similar people cluster together. After weighting, WLS assumes that the errors are in-
dependent. “To assume these errors are independent is to assume that individuals in
the same group share no common unobserved determinants” (Dickens 1990, page 329).
However, this is rarely the case.
Dickens suggests the best way to determine if one should use OLS or WLS (and,
by extension, FGLS) is to test the residuals for heteroskedasticity. In the way I generated
the test elections, this reduced to using OLS when the division sizes were over 10,000
and WLS when they were under 1000. In real elections, one would need to use the test
Dickens suggested, which I did in all cases.
Chapter 4 covered utilizing geographical information in electoral forensics. I briefly
examined the effect of compactness (connectivity) and division number on the quality
of the two geographical methods. That work (n = 2) is far from finished and promises
an interesting vein of information about the relationship between the geometries and the
tests.
Furthermore, the jaggedness of the power curves is very interesting to me. What
causes such irregularity in the rejection rate? If we knew that, would we be able to
modify the tests appropriately?
Lastly, Gaussian random fields may offer an interesting paradigm through which
to view this geographical aspect.
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Throughout it all, I steadfastly refused to transform the proportions using the
logit transformation. Future work should be done using the transformed data, first
determining which transformation is most helpful; there are several.
Finally, the most important use of this research is to use this research: test elec-
tions for evidence of unfairness. However, one does need to keep in mind the maxim
opening this dissertation: the choice is between humility and humiliation. No matter
how small the p-value or how large the effect, Type I Errors abound.
7.2. Denouement
I started this journey in the summer of 2009. I sat in the office of my then-advisor, Daniel
Q. Naiman, discussing generalized linear models when I turned the conversation toward
the recent election in Iran. The protesters were certain of fraud. The Western journalists
were certain of fraud. It seemed as though everyone was certain of fraud. Even the
Political Scientist-Statistician Walter Mebane, Jr., was certain of fraud (Mebane 2010).
I could not see the evidence.
In that biweekly meeting, I discussed Mebane’s evidence for it—the Benford test.
Neither of us was convinced, especially given the test’s origin. Professor Naiman sug-
gested I investigate more closely. And thus was born my relationship with electoral
forensics.
Almost five years later, I am at the conclusion of my first major work in this
nascent field. With the statistical techniques examined in this monograph, I am better
prepared to tackle the Iranian 2009 Presidential election and other elections claiming the
mantle of democracy—the game is afoot.
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